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The Arc and Architecture of Private Enforcement Regimes
in the United States and Europe: A View Across the Atlantic
JASON RATHOD* AND SANDEEP VAHEESAN**
ABSTRACT
The United States and Europe have traditionally taken very different
approaches to the regulation of harmful conduct. Previously, European
nations relied almost entirely on the public enforcement of laws, whereas the
United States relied on a mix of public and private actors. In the United
States, private rights of action have played a central role deterring illegal
conduct—and, in fact, provided greater deterrence than public enforcers in
some areas of law. They have also allowed injured parties to obtain
compensation. Despite their very different histories, the private enforcement
systems in the United States and Europe are showing signs of convergence
today.
Since the 1970s, industry in the United States has waged a potent public
relations campaign against private rights of action. This pro-business
crusade has depicted corporations as victims of a litigation explosion and
cast plaintiffs and their attorneys as unscrupulous mercenaries. This
narrative has little, if any, empirical support. Nonetheless, based on this
mythology, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have erected a
number of procedural obstacles to effective private enforcement of law.
While private enforcement is in retreat in the United States, the
European Union seeks to strengthen private rights of action, with an
emphasis on private enforcement of antitrust law. Recent EU initiatives
established some of the foundations for private parties to protect their rights
in court. European policymakers, however, have as yet declined to establish
effective claims’ aggregation and litigation funding mechanisms, citing the
business victimhood mythology spread by private industry in the United
States. Encouragingly, a few EU Member States have rejected this paradigm
and established some of the elements of strong private rights of action. In
particular, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom
have passed laws that are likely to foster effective private litigation.
A comparative analysis of enforcement institutions on both sides of the
Atlantic reveals a complex picture. American and European consumers,
workers, and other large groups will generally face major obstacles to
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vindicating their rights. In cases generating larger individual claims,
American and European plaintiffs’ lawyers may still be able to use aggregate
settlement procedures to hold corporate defendants to account.
When understanding its contribution to the deterrence of harmful
conduct, private enforcement has to be viewed together with public
enforcement. Because much of the enhancement of private enforcement in
the European Union arises in the context of antitrust, it is an area ripe for
cross-continent examination.
With antitrust, the overall enforcement
landscapes in the United States and European Union will likely be
drastically different in the medium term. Due to limited public enforcement,
a decrease in private lawsuits will severely compromise overall antitrust
enforcement in the United States. In Europe, strong public enforcement will
offset generally weak private enforcement and result in far more effective
protection of consumer rights.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States and European nations have long taken different
approaches to the regulation of socially harmful conduct. Traditionally,
Europe has relied almost exclusively on public enforcement of laws through
robust regulatory apparatuses. The United States, in contrast, has historically
used a mix of public and private enforcement. The vigorous private
enforcement regime in the United States allowed civil society to regulate
harmful conduct directly through lawsuits.
Today, though, the private enforcement systems in the United States and
Europe are showing signs of convergence. In the United States, private
industry has waged a relentless—and effective—political and public relations
crusade against private enforcement. Beginning in the 1970s, industry
cultivated and propagated a business victimhood mythology, depicting
corporations as victims of a litigation explosion and casting plaintiffs (and
their attorneys) as mercenaries out to make a quick buck. This so-called “tort
reform” campaign has played a powerful role in reshaping the attitudes of the
public, legislators, and judges. As a result, the federal courts have erected
several barriers that severely limit the scope and efficacy of private
enforcement in the United States.
While private enforcement has been in retreat in the United States, it has
started to gain some traction in Europe. The European Union’s initiatives
have sought to strengthen private rights of action, particularly in the area of
antitrust law. The private enforcement project, however, has assumed a one
step forward, half step back pace so far. In some critical procedural areas,
EU policymakers have unquestioningly adopted American business
victimhood mythology and declined to establish the procedures necessary for
effective private rights of action. Until this mentality is shed, there will only
be a halting rise of private enforcement in Europe, whether in the realm of
antitrust law or more generally.
A comparative analysis of enforcement institutions on both sides of the
Atlantic reveals a complex picture. Private enforcement will likely display
signs of functional convergence in the United States and Europe—with
consumers and other large, dispersed groups facing major obstacles to
vindicating their rights. In the longer term, some European Union Member
States appear likely to enact stronger private rights of actions. Importantly,
private enforcement has to be examined in the context of overall
enforcement—private and public. For example, looking at an area of law
that has been the focus of European reform, antitrust, the overall enforcement
landscapes will be very different.
Given the limitations of public
enforcement in the United States, the weakened private enforcement system
will severely compromise overall enforcement.
In Europe, public
enforcement is robust, so despite largely ineffective private enforcement in
most Member States, overall enforcement will, in general, remain strong.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the role of private
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enforcement in deterring conduct harmful to the public. Part II charts the rise
of the big business-led campaign against private rights of action in the 1970s
and 1980s in the United States. Part III reviews how the federal courts,
drawing on this “tort reform” rhetoric, have significantly curtailed private
rights of action. Moving across the Atlantic, Part IV describes the European
Union’s mixed efforts to promote private enforcement and the influence of
the corporate anti-civil justice narrative. Part V presents a comparative
analysis of private rights of action. Part VI examines the interplay between
public and private enforcement in the context of antitrust law in the United
States and European Union.
I. DETERRING HARMFUL CONDUCT THROUGH PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
A. Theory of Optimal Deterrence
Economics offers insights on how to structure legal regimes to deter
socially harmful conduct. To deter damaging conduct “optimally,” the
expected cost of engaging in the conduct should equal its net social harm.1
The expected cost is the total value of the civil and criminal sanctions
multiplied by the probability of detection multiplied by the probability of
liability. In mathematical terms, it can be expressed as:
optimal expected penalty = net harm
expected penalty = legal penalties*p(detection)*p(liability)
optimal
expected
penalties
=
optimal
legal
penalties*p(detection)*p(liability)
optimal
legal
penalties
=
optimal
expected
penalties/[p(detection)*p(liability)]
optimal legal penalties = net harm/[p(detection)*p(liability)]
Even a strong penalty may be ineffective if enforcement mechanisms
uncover and prosecute only a small percentage of wrongful behavior. A
numerical example illustrates how deterrence can be increased or decreased.
Assume that a manufacturer can deprive workers of one million dollars in
earned wages and bolster its own bottom-line. The manufacturer has a fifty
percent probability of being caught and held liable.
harm = $1,000,000
probability of being caught and held liable = 0.5
optimal penalty = $1,000,000/0.5 = $2,000,000
1

See, e.g., Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 180 (1968); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 652, 656 (1983). While it can inform policymaking, the optimal deterrence framework
has drawn criticism for its narrow and reductionist view of human behavior. See generally
LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2010).
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In this example, the government would have to impose a penalty of
$2,000,000 to deter the manufacturer from engaging in wage theft. If the
penalty were lower and the probability of being caught and held liable
remained constant, the manufacturer would have an incentive to steal wages
because the gains would exceed the expected costs.
To deter harmful conduct, policymakers can raise the penalties imposed,
but can also increase the enforcement resources devoted to detecting and
prosecuting the illegal behavior. For example, staffing of enforcement
authorities can be increased. More “enforcers on the beat” raise the
likelihood that wrongful conduct is detected and remedied through the
administrative or judicial process. And, of course, penalties and enforcement
resources can be increased simultaneously.
B. Private Enforcement Can Achieve Public Ends
Public and private resources can be used in conjunction to achieve
optimal deterrence. Typically, a government agency is entrusted to enforce a
particular set of laws across an entire society or a particular segment of the
economy. Private parties can also be empowered to file lawsuits and serve as
“private attorneys general.”2
The government is conventionally seen as the enforcer of laws and
regulations. Legislatures establish dedicated agencies to enforce, for
example, environmental protection and securities laws. In the United States,
the government established the Environmental Protection Agency3 and
Securities and Exchange Commission4 to enforce these laws. These agencies
employ attorneys, economists, and other experts to uncover and prosecute
legal violations. Government enforcers learn of possible violations through a
number of means, including their own investigations as well as complaints
from private parties. If an investigation finds that legal action is warranted,
agencies file complaints in court or a specialized administrative body.
The government is not the only enforcer of laws, however. Private
parties, typically injured parties, can bring lawsuits against alleged
wrongdoers, seeking monetary and non-monetary remedies. Because every
citizen is now a potential legal enforcement official, private enforcement has
been described as “state power exercised through society.”5
C. Private Enforcement Generates Public Benefits
1. Deterrence: Private Enforcement Complements Public Enforcement
In modern societies, even the most dedicated government agency is
2

Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
Reorganization Plan No. 3, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (July 9, 1970).
4
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–pp.
5
SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (2010).
3
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unlikely to have the resources to uncover all instances of illegal conduct.
With large populations and complex economies, even a team of committed
public enforcers cannot be expected to catch, let alone prosecute, every
violation. Take the securities laws as an example. In today’s leading
financial markets, millions of transactions involving millions of participants
take place every day.6 A non-trivial fraction of securities fraud is bound to
remain hidden from the eye of enforcers. And during times of fiscal
austerity, government budget cuts further diminish the ability of enforcement
agencies to uncover wrongdoing.7 Smaller agency staffs mean that even
some strong cases may be settled on suboptimal terms or not pursued at all.
The limits of government enforcers extend beyond resource constraints.
Government agencies can be subject to improper political influence. The
target of an investigation can undertake sustained lobbying to dampen an
agency’s initiative.8 The wrongdoer can even engage in outright bribery of
government officials. Those that plead their case before the government are
not likely to be representative of society; groups composed of a few large
players (such as an oligopolistic industry) are much more likely to lobby than
groups composed of a large number of players with small individual stakes
(such as American consumers).9 The “revolving door” between industry and
government can be another source of lax enforcement. Government
officials—who have worked in the regulated industry or expect to do so
again—may identify strongly with market participants and adopt a
permissive approach toward past and future clients and employers.10
Ideology in the political branches of government can also lead to
underenforcement of laws. In presidential systems, both the legislature and
the executive have tools at their disposal to dilute enforcement of laws that
they dislike. For example, the president can weaken an executive agency by
appointing officials who bring fewer enforcement actions11 and write lenient
rules for industry.12 For its part, Congress can starve an executive agency of
6

At the New York Stock Exchange alone, anywhere between five hundred million and two
billion shares have been traded every day in recent years. See Daily NYSE Group Volume in
NYSE
Listed,
2015,
NYSE
MARKET
DATA,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=3141&
category=3.
7
Jim Snyder & Jim Rowley, Budget Deal Opens “Age of Austerity” for Federal Agencies,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-22/congressquick-fix-budget-only-dulls-pain-of-85-billion-in-cuts.
8
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 435, 449 (1991).
9
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 21–22 (1965).
10
Edna Earle Vass Johnson, Agency “Capture”: The Revolving Door Between Regulated
Industries and Their Regulating Agencies, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 95, 98 (1983).
11
See, e.g., John Solomon & Juliet Eilperin, Bush’s EPA Is Pursuing Fewer Polluters, WASH.
POST (Sep. 30, 2007).
12
See, e.g., Ronald P. Jackson, Jr., Extending the Success of the Acid Rain Provisions of the
Clean Air Act: An Analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative and Other Proposed Legislative and
Regulatory Schemes to Curb Multi-Pollutant Emissions from Fossil Fueled Electric
Generating Plants, 12 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 91, 107 (2005).
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funding for enforcement.13
In light of the real limitations on public enforcement, private rights of
action can play an important complementary function. Public enforcement,
due to resource constraints, political pressure, and ideological considerations,
cannot realistically be entrusted to enforce laws and regulations at the
optimal level. Private enforcement, which relies on the collective ability and
initiative of the population, can compensate for the shortcomings of
government enforcement. Because private plaintiffs are neither dependent
on government budgets nor constrained by the ideological biases of the
political branches of government, they can be expected to enforce laws in a
more consistent manner over time.
Public enforcement officials themselves have recognized the value of
private rights of actions. A head of the Antitrust Division in the Truman
Administration described private actions as being “of substantial help” to the
antitrust mission.14 He added: “[I]f you did away with the triple damages suit
entirely and still wanted substantial enforcement . . . you would have to
quadruple the size of the Antitrust Division.”15 In a 2013 amicus brief filed
jointly by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in the
Supreme Court, the two agencies wrote that “[p]rivate actions are a vital
supplement to government enforcement not only under the antitrust laws, but
also under a wide range of other statutes.”16 Similarly, European public
authorities have acknowledged that they realistically cannot carry the entire
burden of detecting and punishing illegal behavior.17
Empirical research has found that private enforcement generates
significant deterrence of socially harmful behavior. Joshua Davis and Robert
Lande studied sixty antitrust cases between 1990 and 2011 in which plaintiffs
either won at trial or reached settlements with defendants.18 In the cases
reviewed, they found that the relief obtained by private plaintiffs produced
substantial deterrence value, often in excess of public fines.19 These sixty
cases generated monetary recoveries three times greater than the civil and
13

See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, THE MEAT RACKET: THE SECRET TAKEOVER OF
AMERICA’S FOOD BUSINESS 301 (2014).
14
Study of Monopoly Power: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82 Cong. Rec.
15 (1951) (Statement of H. Graham Morison, Assistant Att’y Gen. in charge of the Dep’t of
Justice, Antitrust Div.).
15
Id.
16
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant , 133 S. Ct. 2304, at 55 (2013) (No. 12-133).
17
See, e.g., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, PRIVATE ACTIONS IN COMPETITION LAW: EFFECTIVE
REDRESS FOR CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS 15–16 (2007) (“Since there are . . . inevitably cases
which the competition authorities do not pursue, consumers who do not have the resources or
skills to pursue redress on their own are disadvantaged vis-à-vis infringing undertakings.”)
[hereinafter OFT, PRIVATE ACTIONS].
18
Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement
and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 315, 318 (2011);
Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2013).
19
Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 18, at 336–37.
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criminal penalties obtained by U.S. public enforcers in all cartel cases during
the same twenty-one year period, even when prison terms for individuals are
monetized.20 Their analysis used assumptions that, if anything, were strongly
biased in favor of the relief obtained by the government.21
Private rights of action have been shown to produce substantial public
benefits in other areas of law, as well.22 In employment discrimination and
fair housing law, Michael Selmi has shown that private plaintiffs bring many
more cases, advance more aggressive legal theories, and seek more
substantial remedies than federal enforcers do.23 James Cox and Randall
Thomas have uncovered similar patterns in the enforcement of securities law.
While they credit the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) for
improving its enforcement priorities after the collapse of Enron,24 they also
found that between 1997 and 2002 private plaintiffs went after larger
defendants, who likely inflicted greater harm on investors, than the SEC
did.25 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in a recent study of
litigation involving consumer financial products between 2010 and 2012,
found that for sixty-eight percent of the examined class actions there was no
corresponding public enforcement action.26
Even when there were
overlapping public and private actions, the private cases preceded the public
ones in most instances.27
Governments do not face a binary choice of either public or private
enforcement. Instead, they can use both mechanisms to promote optimal
deterrence of harmful conduct. Public and private enforcement each have
their strengths. Government agencies are likely better suited to bringing
complex, resource-intensive enforcement actions. Because every member of
a society is a potential enforcer and not dependent on the public purse,
however, private enforcers are less susceptible to changes in the political
winds and more likely to exercise constant vigilance. Public and private
20

Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private
Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2013).
21
See Davis & Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment, supra note 18, at
1296 (“We show that only if one disvalues a year in prison as greater than $43-48 million
would DOJ anti-cartel enforcement deter more anti-competitive conduct than private
enforcement.”); id. at 1301 (“It also should be noted that the victims in the cases we studied
sometimes received products, coupons, or discounts. The methodology of our study was to be
conservative by not counting the compensatory effects of products, coupons, discounts or rate
reductions.”).
22
See generally J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).
23
Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1998).
24
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities
Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 906–07 (2004).
25
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry,
53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777–78 (2002).
26
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY § 9.4 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB
ARBITRATION STUDY], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-studyreport-to-congress-2015.pdf.
27
Id. at § 9.4.1–2.
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enforcement should be seen as complements that are both important to
deterring harmful behavior.
2. Private Rights of Action Serve an Important Compensatory Function
In addition to their deterrence benefits, private rights of action produce
significant public value through their compensatory function. If public
enforcement could achieve optimal deterrence, it would, as presently
constituted, still fail to provide redress to injured parties. Obviously, prison
sentences for guilty individuals fail to provide any (monetary) compensation
to victims. Civil and criminal fines typically go to the government treasury,
rather than to those harmed by illegal conduct.28 And the social safety net
may, at most, provide only partial relief for affected individuals.
Private rights of action play a vital compensatory function. Money
obtained through litigation can supplement social insurance programs and
provide immediate assistance to injured parties. Damages can cover lost
wages, costs of medical care, and emotional distress arising from another
party’s unlawful conduct. Similarly, victims of wage theft, antitrust, and
securities violations can recover the money they would have earned or
retained but for illegal market behavior.
The money recovered by injured parties through private lawsuits is
substantial. A study of over one thousand class actions from 1990 to 2003
found that settlements generate substantial compensation for victims of
illegal behavior. On average, 81.6 cents of every dollar recovered went to
class members, meaning that less than twenty percent of the settlement funds
went to attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses.29 In comparison, an
attorney in a personal injury lawsuit typically can obtain a contingent fee of
thirty to forty percent of the final award.30 In their case study of sixty
successful private antitrust actions, Davis and Lande found that consumers
and competitors injured by anticompetitive conduct recovered approximately
thirty-five billion dollars,31 with twenty percent of the total covering legal
and administrative costs.32 And this figure understates the redress obtained;
the authors did not attempt to value the discounts, coupons, and other relief
that are more difficult to quantify in monetary terms.33 The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau found that between 2010 and 2012 class actions
provided gross monetary and in-kind relief of $2.7 billion to consumers
28

This is, of course, not universally true. E.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
CFPB Takes Action to Obtain $120 Million in Redress from Sprint and Verizon for Illegal
Mobile Cramming (May 12, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-takesaction-to-obtain-120-million-in-redress-from-sprint-and-verizon-for-illegal-mobilecramming/.
29
Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Costs Myth: The Social
Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 131 (2006).
30
Id.
31
Davis & Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment, supra note 18, at 1273.
32
Id. at 1309.
33
Id. at 1310.
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injured by illegal conduct in six financial services markets.34 Attorneys’ fees
and administrative costs accounted for $489 million, or roughly eighteen
percent of the total.35
D. Effective Private Enforcement Requires Proper Incentives for
Plaintiffs
To promote effective private enforcement, governments must establish
the proper incentives for parties to bring suits. Litigation can be a very costly
undertaking so the expected benefits must be correspondingly large. A
statutory private right of action is likely to be a dead letter if it imposes costly
procedural burdens and provides for only modest recoveries for successful
plaintiffs.
Sean Farhang has set out an analytical framework for understanding the
incentives for private plaintiffs.36 A successful lawsuit results in a plaintiff
obtaining relief, which can be both monetary and non-monetary.37 Common
forms of relief include compensatory damages, punitive damages, restitution,
and injunctions. Of course, non-monetary relief that does not have an
explicit dollar figure attached to it can still be of tremendous value to
parties.38 The sum total of the potential relief is a plaintiff’s benefit from
litigation. Because a plaintiff is not guaranteed to win his or her case, the
possible benefits from litigation have to be discounted by the probability of
success. As for costs, plaintiffs typically have to incur various expenses
including attorneys’ fees, filing fees, expert fees, and the costs of taking
discovery. In mathematical terms, a plaintiff’s benefit-cost analysis can be
expressed as follows:
EV = expected value of lawsuit
B = value of relief from successful lawsuit
p(success) = probability of successful lawsuit
C = costs of lawsuit
EV = B*p(success) - C39
For a plaintiff to file a lawsuit, the expected value (EV) must be a
positive value. A party is unlikely to pursue litigation if its expected value is
negative. And even if the expected value is positive, the value has to be
sufficiently large to make litigation worthwhile. If a potential lawsuit has
costs of $1,000,000 and has expected benefits of $1,000,100, few plaintiffs
are likely to file a claim. If the “rate of return” is too small, parties and their
34

CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 26, at § 8.3.3.
Id.
36
FARHANG, supra note 5, at 22.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
35
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attorneys are unlikely to “invest” in a case.40 In the described hypothetical,
the suit has an expected rate of return of 0.01 percent—a return lower than
even what savings accounts offer under today’s very low interest rates.41
State actors can encourage and discourage private enforcement, exerting
influence over the level of deterrence that a private enforcement regime
provides. First, when adopting a private enforcement mechanism for a
particular law, legislators can actively adjust the inputs into the private
enforcement equation to engineer the preferred level of private
enforcement.42
Consider the inputs associated with bringing suit: the expected benefit,
the probability of success, and the expected cost. Legislators can enhance
and reduce the expected benefit of a private right of action through assorted
means. Who can bring a lawsuit is closely related to expected benefits. If an
individual can bring suit only in his or her individual capacity, litigation may
frequently be unattractive. The costs of litigation are likely to swamp the
value of even the largest possible recovery in many cases. In contrast, if an
individual can file a representative or class action—a suit on behalf of herself
as well as thousands of other persons who have suffered a similar harm—the
benefit-cost analysis may be different. Similarly, organizations, such as
those representing consumers, can be authorized to bring a lawsuit on behalf
of all their members. In both scenarios, the common costs of litigation can
be spread among thousands of parties and turn low, or negative, value
individual suits into a single group claim with a large expected positive
value.
In addition, lawmakers exercise control over the prospective aggregate
effect of a suit under the statute. They could establish opt-out class actions in
which similarly situated individuals (the “class members”) are bound by the
judgment in a class suit unless the class members opt out in advance. Or
legislators could impose an opt-in requirement in which individuals
affirmatively have to opt in to join the suit, which would depress the number
of class members, decreasing the potential benefit.
Damages are another area in which legislators can change the benefits of
bringing suit.43 Legislators could increase the benefit by enhancing the
40
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damages available to a prevailing plaintiff through, for instance, the
provision of statutory or treble damages. They can also reduce the expected
benefit by barring the availability of damages altogether and permitting
plaintiffs to only seek declaratory or injunctive relief.
Legislators can increase the probability of success by limiting the
elements required to state a claim, broadening the scope of discovery, and
extending statutes of limitations. By the same token, legislators can decrease
the probability of success by requiring plaintiffs to establish several legal
elements and demanding more stringent proof to ultimately prevail.
As to expected cost, legislators can decrease the expected cost by
mandating one-way fee-shifting by which prevailing plaintiffs would be
entitled to their attorneys’ fees from defendants, but defendants would not be
entitled to attorneys’ fees should they prevail. Legislators can increase
expected cost by instituting a “loser pays” rule in which the losing side pays
the fees and costs of the prevailing side. “Loser pays” makes plaintiffs,
particularly those of modest means, reluctant to pursue all but the most
airtight claims and necessitates costly pre-suit investigations. Ultimately, the
interplay of all three factors—the expected benefit, the probability of
success, and the expected cost of bringing suit—dictate whether a suit is
brought.44
Second, once a private right of action is in place and its general
parameters have been defined, other government institutions can alter its
effects, sometimes dramatically. The judiciary is the principal actor that can
subsequently change the equation. The legislature could try and craft a
statute to have a small or large potential aggregate effect, but judges have
appreciable discretion to construe the statute in a manner that amplifies or
diminishes the legislative vision. In the United States, civil procedure is
trans-substantive, permitting judges to modify procedure and impact
substantive rights across many areas of law.45 For instance, a judge could
apply onerous pleading requirements that force plaintiffs to plead minutiae to
survive a motion to dismiss. Such a policy would increase the costs of
litigation for plaintiffs and reduce the probability of success. Another
element of procedure that could be of large import is the ease—or
difficulty—of bringing class actions on behalf of a large number of injured
parties.
II. THE UNITED STATES’ ONCE STRONG CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM HAS BEEN
WEAKENED BY INDUSTRY’S “TORT REFORM” CAMPAIGN
A. The United States’ Private Enforcement Tradition and Its Decline

44
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The United States has a rich legacy of private enforcement. In Marbury
v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed: “The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”46
This
understanding was gospel from America’s earliest days.47
Private enforcement has long provided not just a remedy for injured
individuals, but also deterred harmful conduct. With limited public law
enforcement capacity, early American colonies relied on private citizens to
enforce law through qui tam statutes, which empowered whistleblowers to
file suit on behalf of the government (and share in the proceeds) when they
had information about statutory violations and frauds on the public
treasury.48 To this day, qui tam remains a vital tool in combating waste,
fraud and abuse.49 More generally, private enforcement today acts as “an
indispensable satellite regulatory system that augments and sometimes serves
as a substitute for the work of official governmental agencies.”50
The civil justice system is in decline, however, thanks to a campaign led
by private industry. Since the 1970s, corporate America has waged a largely
successful war to roll back private rights of action that protect all Americans
from harmful conduct in the market and society.
B. The Powell Memo: A Battle Plan for Undermining Business
Regulation
Perhaps no document better captures the mentality and strategic plan of
industry than a memorandum written by Lewis F. Powell Jr. in 1971, just two
months prior to his nomination as a Supreme Court Justice.51 At that time,
Mr. Powell was a well-regarded corporate attorney who defended the tobacco
industry in numerous suits and sat on the board of Philip Morris.52
The confidential memo written for the Chamber of Commerce, entitled
“Attack on the American Free Enterprise System,” is a call to arms to
American business.53 It alleged that private industry—and, indeed, the free
46

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1486 (1987)
(“[T]hat every person should have a judicial remedy for every legal injury done him was a
common provision in the bills of rights of state constitutions; [and] was invoked by The
Federalist No. 43 in a passage whose very casualness indicated its uncontroversial quality.”
(footnote omitted)).
48
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED
FEDERAL STATUTES 3, 3 n.14 (2009), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf (listing a
number of colonial-era qui tam statutes).
49
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2002).
50
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 301 (2013).
51
KIM M. PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN 156–65 (2009) (providing background).
52
Id at 15657.
53
Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman,
Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Attack on American Free Enterprise System 1
47

2015

A VIEW ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

317

market system itself—was under relentless attack by “the Communists, New
Leftists and other revolutionaries”54 who were “far more numerous, better
financed, and increasingly . . . more welcomed and encouraged by other
elements of society, than ever before in our history.”55 The ostensibly radical
message had resonated with, and enjoyed amplification from, mainstream
institutions—including universities, the media, and legislators.56 The
troubling results were reflected in “the stampedes by politicians to support
almost any legislation related to ‘consumerism’ or to the ‘environment’”57
and the litigation successes enjoyed “at business’ expense” by “labor unions,
civil rights groups and . . . the public interest law firms . . . extremely active
in the judicial arena.”58 Yet, in Powell’s view, industry sat idly by as its
attackers added to their ranks, including through television, which “play[ed]
such a predominant role in shaping the thinking, attitudes and emotions of
our people.”59
To reshape public opinion,60 Powell proposed a multipronged response
by industry that would be led by the Chamber of Commerce.61 The plan of
action focused on four fronts: media, education, politics and law.
As to the last of these, the law, Powell stressed that the judiciary had
affected American business as much as any branch of government. In fact,
the structure of the American system prompted Powell to conclude “the
judiciary may be the most important instrument for social, economic and
political change.”62 Consequently, judicial action represented a “vast area of
opportunity” for which businesses should provide generous funding. 63
Industry heeded the call to arms, mobilizing its resources from the 1970s
onward to mold public opinion and public policy. Between 1968 and 1978,
the number of corporations with public affairs offices in Washington D.C.
grew fivefold.64 Corporate Political Action Committees (“PACs”) grew
fourfold in number between 1976 and the mid-1980s.65 And the number of
firms with registered lobbyists in the city grew by a remarkable multiple of
fifteen, from 175 to 2,500.66 Alongside greater participation came stronger
organization as well. For example, the Chamber of Commerce, which
(Aug.
23,
1971)
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Powell urged to take the lead on these matters, saw its budget triple and
membership double between 1974 and 1980.67
C. Waging War: The Propagation of Business Victimhood Mythology to
Turn Public Opinion Against Civil Justice and Thwart Private Enforcement
Drawing inspiration from the Powell Memo, corporations and
conservative activists adopted a strategy to turn public opinion against the
civil justice system by launching a pro-industry crusade in media, politics,
education and courts themselves.68 This “tort reform” campaign deployed a
common rhetorical mythology of business victimhood. Business victimhood
was poll-tested and anchored in the ideas that: (1) businesses are victims of a
litigation explosion and (2) litigation is an immoral and unjust method of
dispute resolution. Businesses are victims, the narrative goes, of trial
lawyers who play “jackpot justice” by drumming up frivolous litigation,69 of
runaway juries who have never seen a damage award too large, and of
Americans who file lawsuits for every injury no matter how small.
According to the mythology, the result has been an overly litigious society
that imposes massive burdens on American business and, by extension,
American consumers and workers.
1. Litigation Trends in Recent American History
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed an expansion of rights for groups long
denied them, including racial minorities and women, or protected
incompletely, such as consumers and workers.70 A new generation of
attorneys engaged in public interest litigation to ensure that the new laws
translated into concrete realities on the ground.71 The upshot was that
litigation increased.72
There was no general “litigation explosion,” however. Empirical
evidence suggests that the increase in litigation in the 1970s was modest.73
And, in the decades that followed, litigation rates tapered off.74 Perhaps
more importantly, there is no evidence of any rise in frivolous litigation.
Overall litigation rates are presently comparable to those in other periods of
67
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American history and consistent, on a per-capita basis, with those of other
industrialized countries.75
Since the late 1960s, there has, however, been a historically and
culturally distinctive rise in one type of litigation: class actions. This is the
byproduct of changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966, which
expressly authorized opt-out class actions for damages.76 Although class
action litigation has increased markedly, there is no evidence to substantiate
the view that it is largely frivolous. Two critiques are typically leveled
against class actions: (1) class members receive too little;77 and (2) the mere
threat of a large class damage award blackmails defendants into settling.
Neither has an empirical basis. As to the first point, substantial evidence
exists to the contrary.78 As to the second, the best evidence once again
suggests that it is actually plaintiffs who are systematically disadvantaged
vis-à-vis corporate defendants in contemporary class action litigation.79
2. The Mythology of Business Victimhood
If the record shows that there has not been a discernible uptick in overall
litigation and that class action litigation is mostly beneficial, what explains
the conventional wisdom to the contrary? In this instance, power is
knowledge.
That is, powerful sources have fostered the common
“knowledge” that litigation is out-of-control. Specifically, with the support
of industry, business victimhood mythology has been broadcast in media,
politics, education, and courts themselves, just as the Powell Memo advised.
First, private industry has poured tens of millions of dollars into
spreading business victimhood mythology through public relations
campaigns.80 In the 1970s, insurance companies took out advertisements in
popular print magazines to condemn the purported litigation explosion.81
One, for example, read “‘[w]hen anything goes wrong with me . . . somebody
is going to pay! They owe me!’ Who is this somebody? ‘It's you!’”82 A
study conducted contemporaneously with the placement of the ads found that
75
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“even a single exposure to one of these ads can dramatically lower the
amount of award a juror is willing to give.”83
Starting in the 1980s, industry refined its efforts to shape public attitudes
in support of its anti-litigation efforts.84 Armed with new sampling data,
insurance companies initiated a multi-million dollar campaign across media
platforms with the aim of reaching ninety percent of adults in the country.85
The campaign was anchored in the concept of a “Lawsuit Crisis” and
explained that present-day litigation inflicted harm not just on corporations,
but also on pregnant mothers, high school athletes, and church
congregations.86 It deliberately cast plaintiffs who used the legal system to
vindicate their rights as confrontational, immoral, and attacking bedrock
American values.
A parallel campaign at the time led by just one insurance company,
Aetna, reinforced the notion that corporations are victims of the judicial
system. One advertisement reminded viewers of the infamous, though highly
misleading,87 tale of the McDonald’s coffee lawsuit, stating “[w]hen a
woman riding in an automobile spills hot coffee on her lap, then sues the
restaurant where she bought the coffee, something is wrong.”88 Other
industries jumped on the bandwagon and amplified the message throughout
the 1990s and 2000s.89 Their message has become the conventional
wisdom.90 As one scholar put it, “[w]e believe America is the most litigious
society on earth not because this is true, but because the media have told us
so over and over again. We believe . . . our fellow citizens have a shameless
propensity to file frivolous lawsuits . . . because our newspapers and
television shows inundate our collective consciousness with
[unrepresentative] examples of outrageous and ridiculous litigation.”91
Second, starting in the 1980s, officials at the highest levels of
government propagated business victimhood mythology. Myriam Gilles
observed that:
83

Id. at 456 n. 11.
Id. at 461–64.
85
Id. at 467.
86
Daniels & Martin, supra note 80, at 467.
87
For a summary of the misleading character of attacks on the McDonald’s lawsuit, see
RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION
OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 267–72 (1996) (detailing the third degree burns suffered by the elderly
plaintiff from 180-degree coffee and the 700 other burn cases from McDonald’s coffee that
jurors learned of). The story was also featured in the popular HBO documentary Hot Coffee.
88
Daniels & Martin, supra note 80, at 461–64.
89
Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem,
Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 451–52 (2004).
90
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science, 100
W. VA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2008); Theodore Eisenberg, The Empirical Effects of Tort
Reform, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer Arlen ed.,
forthcoming), http:// ssrn.com/abstract=2032740.
91
Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery
Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1395–96
(1994).
84

2015

A VIEW ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

321

[T]he Reagan Administration provided a nourishing home for all of
these anti-lawsuit reformers. . . . Under the new president, the
Republican Party “began to recognize the value of assaulting legal
liberalism as a strategy” for whipping up their base, and it capitalized
on the convenient narrative that lawyers were “destroying
America.”92
Some in Congress attempted to advance legislation to address the perceived
problem.93 For example, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch pressed for a law
to eliminate statutory fee-shifting rules because they had allegedly created
“exorbitant windfalls for lawyers” responsible for the “explosion of
litigation.”94
In 1989, Vice President Dan Quayle took the helm of the Council on
Competitiveness, which had been established by President Reagan and
focused heavily on the mitigation of litigation’s impact on business.95 When
accepting the Republican nomination for vice president at the party’s
national convention in 1992, Vice President Quayle proclaimed: “[O]ur legal
system is spinning out of control. . . . [O]ur legal system is costing
consumers $300 billion dollars a year. The litigation explosion has damaged
our competitiveness; it has wiped out jobs.”96 Subsequent generations of
conservative leaders have echoed this rhetoric. For instance, President
George W. Bush frequently denounced “frivolous lawsuits.”97
As the business victimhood mythology percolates in political circles, few
have risen to offer a corrective. Prominent Democrats have often chosen to
either lend their own support or remain silent. The result is that the popular
discourse is one-sided and replete with distorted facts shaped by powerful
lobbies.
Third, legal academia has supplied an intellectual framework buttressing
business victimhood mythology. For instance, the ascendancy of the law and
economics movement in legal academia and jurisprudence has provided
fertile ground for business victimhood mythology to thrive. The field of law
and economics emerged in the 1970s and grew rapidly from the 1980s
onward with generous funding from industry-friendly sources such as the
92

See Myriam E. Gilles, The End of Doctrine: Private Arbitration, Public Law and the AntiLawsuit Movement 6 (Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 436, August 28, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2488575. Before he was President, Reagan described public interest
lawyers as “a bunch of ideological ambulance chasers doing their own thing at the expense of
the . . . poor who actually need help.” Ronald J. Ostrow, Legal Services Agency Battles
Reagan Attempt to Cut Off Its Funding, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1981, at B1.
93
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 68, at 1567.
94
Id.
95
Vice President Dan Quayle, In Their Own Words; Excerpts from Vice President Quayle’s
Address, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992.
96
Id.
97
See, e.g., Federal Trials Decline for Injury Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/17/AR2005081702002.html.

322 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 14, No. 2
Olin Foundation.98 Stephen Subrin and Thomas Main observe that “[t]he
movement’s emphasis on wealth maximization and efficiency fits easily into,
and readily supported, the conservative agenda to reduce regulation and
curtail civil litigation.”99 For example, professors use the law and economics
framework to advocate limitations on class actions, reasoning that class
certification creates undue pressure on defendants to settle since they may
face immense exposure.100 While law and economics need not be biased in a
pro-corporate direction, the movement in general has tended to support
research and commentary skewed toward industry.101
Finally, industry has achieved its greatest successes, and witnessed the
most potent amplification of its business victimhood messaging, in the courts
themselves. After the growth of public interest litigation in the 1960s,
industry and political conservatives made activism in the judiciary their top
priority.102 Jurists and lawyers often reflected industry’s rhetoric. In 1976,
Robert Bork wrote that “[w]e are sitting in the center of an explosion of
federal litigation,”103 while Francis R. Kirkham, then chair of the Antitrust
Section of the American Bar Association, “stridently complained about
notice pleading, juries, class actions, abusive discovery, and forced
settlement of meritless claims due to the high cost of litigating.”104 Judge
Bork laid blame for the litigation explosion on an imprudent expansion of
government.105
Chief Justice Warren Burger, whom some credit with coining the phrase
“litigation explosion,”106 opined that American litigiousness represented a
form of “mass neurosis”107 stemming from communal decay of values with
courts “expected to fill the void created by the decline of church, family, and
neighborhood unity.”108 Chief Justice Burger’s sociological analysis, while
provocative, was not supported with real world evidence.109 It did, however,
have the effect of providing elite imprimatur to industry attacks on the civil
justice system.
98
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Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang examined the link between the votes
Justices cast on private enforcement issues and the Justices’ ideological
preferences from 1970 to 2013.110 They found that a Justice’s ideology
strongly correlated with his or her votes on private enforcement issues: “The
conservative-liberal dichotomy . . . perfectly divides our ratio of pro-private
enforcement votes in the following sense: every ‘conservative’ has a lower
pro-private enforcement voting rate than every ‘liberal.’”111 Due to the
Supreme Court’s rightward shift, pro-private enforcement outcomes have
dropped precipitously over time.112 The four most conservative members of
the Court during the 2015 term—Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito and
Roberts113—also had the four most anti-private enforcement scores of all
Justices in the study.114 Today, outcomes in business cases at the Supreme
Court closely align with the positions taken by the Chamber of Commerce’s
formidable legal lobby.115 Somewhere, Lewis Powell is smiling.
III. U.S. COURTS HAVE DRAWN ON INDUSTRY RHETORIC TO RESTRICT
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

In recent decades, federal courts in the United States have lowered the
expected value of bringing private lawsuits. The courts have reduced the
probability and benefits of success and also raised the costs of litigation.
These seemingly technical changes to procedural rules have undermined the
efficacy of private enforcement.116 It is particularly troubling that these
developments have been justified with rhetoric that echoes industry talking
points, including the myth of business victimhood.
110
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A. Decline in the Probability of Success: Pleading Standards.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires plaintiffs to
articulate in their complaint “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”117 The rule’s language reflects
the view of the drafters of the original 1938 Federal Rules that liberal notice
pleading should be the norm.118 Under “notice pleading,” a pleading need
only contain enough factual information for the opposing party to proffer a
coherent response.119 In deliberately adopting notice pleading, the drafters
eschewed the technicality rife in the prior common law and code pleading
regimes,120 rebuffing “attempts to identify ‘facts’ as opposed to ‘conclusions’
[in pleadings], and preferring discovery to pleading as the means to ascertain
what happened.”121
Although under pressure from some quarters to return to previous
pleading systems, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure long
rejected such efforts, as did the Supreme Court, which is reflected in the
once-canonical Conley v. Gibson.122 There, the Court reaffirmed that a
complaint merely had to “give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”123 and that it “should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief”124 For the next fifty years, the pleading
requirements remained essentially unchanged.125
Starting in 2007, however, the Court reversed course, imposing stringent
new requirements on pleading. It ushered in a new, heightened “plausibility”
pleading standard in Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly126 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.127 A principal effect of Twombly and Iqbal has been to decrease the
probability of plaintiff success because many plaintiffs are unable to present
sufficiently specific facts at the suit’s inception and before discovery, to
survive dismissal.
117

FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
See Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
85 YALE L.J. 914, 917 (1976).
119
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501
(1947).
120
Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir.1973) (summarizing this shift
and stating that “[a]ncestor worship in the form of ritualistic pleadings has no more disciples.
The time when the slip of a sergeant's quill pen could spell death for a plaintiff's cause of
action is past. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint is not an
anagrammatic exercise in which the pleader must find just exactly the prescribed combination
of words and phrases.”).
121
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 68, at 1604.
122
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
123
Id. at 47.
124
Id. at 45–46.
125
See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
126
550 U.S. 544 (2007)
127
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
118

2015

A VIEW ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

325

In Twombly, the Court found that, at least in antitrust cases like the one
before it, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment]
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”128 Rather, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative
level,”129 and plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.”130 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court made clear that
the plausibility pleading standard was not limited to the antitrust context and
applied across all civil cases. The decision explicitly affirmed the language
of Twombly, and added that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8
“demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me
accusation,”131 instructing that a complaint should be dismissed when it
contains “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”132
Troublingly, in reaching the holdings in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court
deployed language that echoed industry rhetoric. The Twombly order alluded
to the alleged excessive costs of so-called frivolous litigation and blackmail
settlements. It stated that district courts must “insist upon some specificity in
pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to
proceed”133 and prevent plaintiffs from bringing “a largely groundless
claim”134 intended to coerce an “in terrorem” settlement.135 Given that the
defendant was the federal government, rather than a business, the order in
Iqbal, signed by a bare majority of conservative justices, does not speak quite
in the same register as Twombly. Nevertheless, the Court based its reasoning,
in part, on comparable logic that “litigation . . . exacts heavy costs in terms of
efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might
otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the
Government.”136
As several commentators have observed, the plausibility pleading
standard introduced by Iqbal and Twombly is “nothing less than a
‘revolutionary’ departure from notice pleading and from the original vision
of the Federal Rules.”137 For many plaintiffs, the immediate practical effect
of the new standard is to lower the probability of prevailing. The plaintiffs
most likely to lose at the motion-to-dismiss stage are those with claims
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requiring information held by the defendant in order to be properly pled.138
While neat empirical analyses have proven elusive,139 Iqbal and Twombly
have likely deterred the filing of a meaningful proportion of meritorious
cases and led to the premature dismissal of complaints—claims which likely
would have proceeded to discovery under Conley.140
B. Rise in Expected Costs: Summary Judgment
The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embraced jury trials as the
norm but also established a method to dispose of suits by a judge before trial
under Rule 56. Summary judgment was previously considered, however, “an
exceptional remedy with a very limited role.”141 Early cases involving
summary judgment reflected the strong preference for trials, as illustrated by
the Supreme Court’s 1962 pronouncement that summary judgment is
permitted only “where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, where it is quite clear what the truth is, . . . [and where] no genuine issue
remains for trial” since “the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from
their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try.”142 This reasoning
was powerfully reinforced eight years later in the civil rights case of Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co.143 The Supreme Court held that because a restaurant,
which had allegedly colluded with police to discriminate on the basis of race,
failed to proffer evidence that conclusively “foreclose[d] the possibility” of
the plaintiff’s allegations, the dispute was inappropriate for resolution at
summary judgment.144
Adickes reigned supreme for sixteen years, but, as Judge Diane Wood put
it, “then came the Revolution.”145 The Court reversed course and expanded
the scope of summary judgment in a “trilogy” of decisions issued in 1986:
138
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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,146 Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby,147 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.148 As summarized by Arthur
Miller, “Celotex has made it easier to make the [summary judgment] motion,
and Anderson and Matsushita have increased the chances that it will be
granted.”149 The Court declared in Celotex that when the moving party does
not carry the burden of proof at trial, the moving party could point to the
non-moving party’s absence of evidence as evidence of absence, compelling
summary judgment.150 Matsushita and Anderson give the judge leeway to
effectively substitute his or her judgment for that of the jury. Under
Matsushita, the nonmoving party must come forward with persuasive
evidence to support their claim that when the facts are presented by the
moving party, they render the claim “implausible” to a “reasonable” jury.151
Per Anderson, the nonmoving party must go beyond arguing that the jury
may not believe the facts as presented by the moving party; rather, it must
affirmatively present meaningful, contrary evidence.152
The language and reasoning of the decisions also betrays the Court’s
motivation, inspired by the received wisdom of industry, to address a
perceived litigation explosion and the attendant financial costs for corporate
defendants. In Celotex, for example, Justice Rehnquist, in words that would
have surely astonished the drafters of the Federal Rules, divined symmetry
between a litigant’s constitutional right to present a full and fair case before a
jury of her peers and a defendant’s purported “right” to obtain summary
judgment.153
Due in part to the trilogy, summary judgment has become the focal point
of litigation—with jury trials having all but vanished from most civil dockets
in federal court. To illustrate, in 1938 about one out of five cases went to
trial.154 By 2003, only about one in fifty cases went to trial.155 And while the
absolute number of dispositions increased by five times from 1962 and 2000,
the total number of trials decreased by one-fifth.156
Contrary to the hopes implied in Celotex of reining in litigation costs, the
146
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termination of disputes by a judge at summary judgment, rather than by a
jury at trial, has likely increased the costs of litigation and had a
disproportionately adverse impact on cash-strapped plaintiffs.157 Although
“[t]he term ‘summary judgment’ suggests a judicial process that is simple,
abbreviated, and inexpensive,” Judge D. Brock Hornby has written that “[it]
is none of those.”158 The convoluted and costly nature of contemporary
summary judgment practice emanates principally from the way the trilogy
transformed discovery. Previously, the limited purpose of discovery was to
understand the nature of the claims and defenses of the opposing party to
prepare for an actual trial.159 After the trilogy, litigants have used the
discovery phase to amass as much evidence as possible to make, or
surmount, a summary judgment motion and prepare for what amounts to a
trial on the papers, with evidence culled from mountains of deposition
transcripts, discovery responses, expert reports, and document productions.160
Some may argue that trial is more expensive and complex than summary
judgment, and therefore it is better that a large number of suits get disposed
of at summary judgment. There is, however, no factual basis for the
underlying cost assumption. Trial briefing is more straightforward, and
appeals are less likely in light of appellate standards that accord deference to
jury findings and judges’ trial rulings.161
C. Rise in Expected Costs: Class Certification
A class action is a suit maintained by an individual or group of
individuals, “the named plaintiff(s),” on behalf of those who have suffered a
common harm at the hands of a common culprit, or “the class.”162 The
outcome of a class action binds all parties, which means that a class member
cannot later bring a separate suit on the same claims litigated in the class
action, regardless of the outcome.163 Hence, it is accurate to characterize the
157

See Wood, supra note 145, at 233 (“[M]ore and more people are whispering that the
Emperor has no clothes: that summary proceedings in the federal courts, in combination with
modern pretrial discovery, have had an effect exactly opposite of that which was intended.”);
Subrin & Main, supra note 98, at 1851 (“This fundamental shift is enormously significant,
arguably unconstitutional, probably inefficient, and especially unfair to certain plaintiffs.”).
158
D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment without Illusions, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 273, 273
(2010).
159
Id. at 274 (“Discovery expense regularly serves as poster child for everything wrong with
civil litigation. Notably, about 50% of plaintiffs’ lawyers, 47% of defense lawyers, and 44%
of mixed practice lawyers believe ‘discovery is used more to develop evidence for summary
judgment than it is to understand the other party's claims and defenses for trial.’”) (quoting
ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: FULL REPORT 71 (2009)).
160
Wood, supra note 145, at 241–42; see also Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From the “No
Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination
Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One
Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 716 (2013).
161
Wood, supra note 145, at 250.
162
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
163
See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008).

2015

A VIEW ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

329

class action as a procedural mechanism that expands the scope of parties
bound by a suit’s outcome.
The original Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided
that lawsuits could be maintained as class actions, but set forth conceptually
dense classifications that hampered their use.164 In 1966, Rule 23 was
amended to clarify the nature of the rule and expand its availability.165 Most
important was the new Rule 23(b)(3), which replaced the existing opt-in
mechanism with an opt-out mechanism for participation in class suits by
absent class members.166
For a suit to be maintained as a class action, the criteria elaborated in
Rule 23(a)—commonality, numerosity, typicality and adequacy—must be
met, along with the criteria for one of the categories of suits set forth in Rule
23(b).167 In recent years, courts have imposed onerous, new requirements for
suits to obtain class action status, substantially raising the costs of
litigating.168 A core rationale—openly stated—for the new requirements has
been the perception, eagerly cultivated by industry, that class action suits are
abusive and blackmail defendants into settling.169
Arguably the most dramatic shift in class action jurisprudence has been
from requiring the elements of class certification to be shown principally
through the nature of the pleadings to demanding that each element be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.170 In 1982, the Supreme
Court wrote that class certification is proper only if “the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23 are
met.”171 In recent years, courts’ constriction of class action practice has
largely developed around the subordinate clause “after a rigorous
analysis.”172 This shift, ushered in by some courts of appeals in the 2000s
and later blessed by the Supreme Court, was doctrinally justified as part of
the court’s duty to conduct a “rigorous analysis.”173 As a result, successful
class certification motions today generally come only after extensive
discovery, well-refined expert testimony, and lengthy evidentiary hearings
dedicated solely to class certification, none of which were envisioned by the
164
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original Federal Rules, or the 1966 amendments. 174
In a seminal case that applied rigorous, costly class certification criteria,
In re Hydrogen Peroxide, the Third Circuit justified the new regime by
noting that class certification “create[s] unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants” and that this “potential for
unwarranted settlement pressure is a factor we weigh in our certification
calculus.”175 The Third Circuit is not alone in reasoning from a premise
patterned on unsubstantiated corporate messaging, as almost every circuit has
imposed the same criteria based on the same reasoning.176
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes177 and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 178
the Supreme Court also endorsed this shift. In Dukes, the Court found that
the commonality requirement demands that the plaintiff present a common
contention of such a nature that “determination of its truth or falsity will
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke.”179 Mere pleadings, however, cannot satisfy commonality, or other
Rule 23(a) requirements, as a plaintiff must “affirmatively demonstrate his
compliance” through evidence.180 In Comcast, the Court found that “the
same analytical principles govern Rule 23(b),” and that “[i]f anything, Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule
23(a).”181 Because the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement also calls
for an examination of the elements of the claims that plaintiff seeks to have
certified, some lower courts have applied Comcast in a manner that compels
exhaustive matching of evidence with claims’ elements to demonstrate that
common issues, in fact, prevail over individual ones for each claim.182
The transition from reliance on pleadings to a preponderance of the
evidence for each element of class certification has substantially raised the
costs of class litigation for plaintiffs, who carry the burden for proving that
the suit should be maintained on a class basis.183 The necessary evidence for
each element is typically in the possession of the defendant, demanding
intensive discovery that defendants resist at every turn.184 Further, wellheeled defendants are likely to hire experts to construe the available evidence
in a manner that suggests that plaintiffs have not affirmatively identified
174
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enough parties, shown that resolution of common issues will drive the
litigation and predominate over individual issues, and shown that the class
action is a superior method for resolving disputes over individual litigation.
Accordingly, plaintiffs are compelled to hire their own expert(s) to show that
they have, in fact, met these criteria. In an additional, recent requirement,
plaintiffs’ experts are also subject to motions challenging their qualifications,
methodology and conclusions185 under the standard articulated in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,186 which was intended merely as a
method of protecting juries, not judges, from unsound expert evidence.187
D. Lowered Expected Value: The Ascertainability Prerequisite for Class
Certification
Most of the new requirements of class certification have made the
process more expensive—sometimes exceedingly so—but have not
altogether eliminated the possibility of class actions. Some new procedural
requirements, though, could have this effect. For example, the imposition of
a strict ascertainability requirement demands that plaintiffs be able to readily
ascertain class membership through objective criteria at the class certification
stage. While reasonable sounding on its face, ascertainability may be very
difficult to satisfy in cases implicating inexpensive non-durable goods for
which consumers rarely keep proof of purchase. Strict ascertainability, if
widely adopted, threatens to end most consumer class actions involving a
low-priced consumer good.188 Ascertainability is not found in Rule 23 but
courts have recently deemed it to be an “implicit” requirement that flows
from a perceived need to determine the identities of those who would be
bound by judgment.189
A 2013 Third Circuit decision, Carrera v. Bayer Corp., uses perhaps the
most stringent version of ascertainability to raise hurdles, often
insurmountable, for plaintiffs.190 Largely relying on precedent of his own
making, Judge Scirica, writing for the panel, observed that a “rigorous
analysis” of class action requirements demands that plaintiffs be able to show
at the class certification stage that the members of the putative class are
185
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“currently and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria.”191 The court
held that a putative class of purchasers of an allegedly ineffectual weight loss
supplement, costing approximately fifteen dollars per package, was not
ascertainable.192 The court reasoned that no objective criteria existed to
determine class members because consumers were unlikely to retain proof of
purchase, only some retailers retained records of sales to individuals, and the
submission of affidavits to show proof of purchase purportedly invited
fraudulent claims.193
Strict ascertainability requirements have been premised on protecting
supposedly vulnerable corporate defendants. In Carrera, the Third Circuit
justified its rigorous ascertainability requirement on an alleged “due process
right” of corporate defendants “to challenge the proof used to demonstrate
class membership.”194 In civil rights litigation, plaintiffs are routinely
instructed that a procedural due process violation must be tethered to “the
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of liberty and property,”195 whereas the corporate defendant in
Carrera was not. Had the court applied this well-established standard in
Carrerra, it should have found that the total damages are ascertainable
through the defendant’s sales records. The defendant’s due process right, if
any, should only entitle it to pay out no more than that amount in
compensatory damages, not dictate the distribution of this money.196 Even if
the defendant did have such a due process right, however, that right is to be
weighed, as it is in the civil rights context, against competing interests,
including the values served by class actions and private enforcement more
generally.197
E. Lowered Expected Value: Bilateral Arbitration
Judicial compulsion of lawsuits to arbitration, and enforcement of class
action waivers, has also dramatically reduced the expected value of filing
suit. Arbitration is a form of extrajudicial dispute resolution in which an
ostensibly neutral actor resolves disputes in an informal setting lacking many
procedural protections found in courts. This enables a speedier, but arguably
less just, resolution. In addition, present-day arbitration clauses contain class
action waivers, which courts have enforced, that prevent individuals from
participating in class actions and other aggregate suits.198
191

Id. at 306 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)).
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 308–09.
193
Id. at 309–11.
194
Id. at 307.
195
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
196
Discussion with Deepak Gupta, Founding Principal, Gupta Wessler PLLC (2014). We
thank Mr. Gupta for conveying his astute observation.
197
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
198
See, e.g., Cronin v. CitiFinancial Servs., Inc., 352 F. App’x 630, 636 (3d Cir. 2009); Carter
v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Incl, 362 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2004); Wince v. Easterbrooke
Cellular Corp., 681 F. Supp. 2d 679, 683 (N.D.W. Va. 2010).
192

2015

A VIEW ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

333

In the early 20th century, arbitration gained favor as an efficient method
of resolving business-to-business disputes, with the Federal Arbitration Act
of 1925 (“FAA”) abrogating judicial barriers to contractual arbitration. The
text of the FAA features two seemingly inconsistent provisions.199 The FAA
declared arbitration clauses presumptively “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable.”200 This apparently broad grant of authority existed alongside
an equally broad restriction contained in the FAA’s savings clause, which
exempted from the statute’s purview grounds that “exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.”201
The FAA had only modest effects early in its lifespan. The statute’s
legislative history shows that Congress intended the statute to be procedural
in nature202 and to facilitate enforcement of business-to-business arbitration
agreements for claims brought in federal court—and only in federal court.203
The statute was not to apply in state court and was not intended to preempt
state law.204 This understanding was so fundamental that even litigants did
not bother attempting to unsettle it.205 In addition, the savings clause
preserved cases implicating important rights as “judges denied motions to
compel arbitration of antitrust, securities, pension, and patent disputes, and
refused to grant preclusive effect to arbitrators’ rulings on claims under civil
rights statutes.”206
The sea change began in the 1980s and coincided with the growth of
industry’s efforts against private enforcement.207 Southland v. Keating, an
early and significant decision, held that the FAA applies in state court and
preempts conflicting state law.208 In the next term, the Court held that the
FAA could also bar adjudication of federal statutory rights in a court of
law.209 Previously, the Court had drawn a clear distinction between
contractual and statutory claims with the latter protected from compulsion to
arbitration.210 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
199
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Inc.,211 however, the Court, channeling the ascendant industry-driven
narrative of a litigation explosion, announced that there is no comparative
benefit to a “day in court” over a day in an arbitral conference room.212
Accordingly, the Court ruled the antitrust claim before it should be moved to
arbitration.213
The Court, however, stressed that its ruling was limited because a
showing of “overwhelming economic power” could still provide grounds for
the revocation of an arbitration clause214 and the propriety of arbitration still
rested on the ability of a litigant to effectively vindicate its statutory rights in
arbitration.215
While these limitations on arbitration provided some solace to plaintiffs,
they, too, were eliminated by the Court in the 2000s. The final victories of
arbitration were driven by private industry. In the mid-to-late 1990s, a forprofit arbitration outfit instructed its corporate clientele in marketing
materials that the best way to fortify its defenses against class action liability
was to include arbitration clauses with class action waivers in its form
contracts with consumers.216 Many corporations ran with this advice.217
Courts now routinely enforce arbitration clauses and class action waivers,
which are increasingly ubiquitous. In 2010, the Supreme Court went so far
as to prevent arbitrators from ordering class-wide arbitration unless an
arbitration agreement expressly permits class proceedings, making class
action waivers the default.218
In the past five years, two decisions have eviscerated the potential
limitations on arbitration’s scope as outlined in Mitsubishi Motors. First, the
notion that “overwhelming economic power” could act as a limit on
arbitration was effectively abandoned in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.219 In
Concepcion, plaintiff consumers initiated a putative class action lawsuit
is inimical to the public policies underlying the [Fair Labor Standards Act], thus depriving an
employee of protected statutory rights.”) and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
56–57 (1974) (“Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contract disputes,
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created
by Title VII. . . . [T]he resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary
responsibility of courts.”)).
211
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against a cell phone company, alleging that the company induced them to
enter into contracts by offering a free phone, but subsequently charged the
consumers $30.22 to cover sales taxes.220 The contract contained an
arbitration clause with a class-action waiver that required plaintiffs to
proceed in arbitration only on a bilateral basis with the company, rather than
on behalf of all consumers who had been similarly defrauded.221 Under
governing California law, the district court and the Ninth Circuit held that
adhesion contracts of this kind were considered unconscionable because they
enabled those with overwhelming economic power to “deliberately cheat
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money[.]”222
No rational consumer would bring an individual claim for such paltry
damages.223
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, invoking
business victimhood mythology. The Court held that the California law
barring class action waivers in adhesion contracts as unconscionable was an
impermissible “obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives,”
and therefore, was preempted.224 The Court brushed aside concerns that the
absence of a class mechanism would mean that small-value claims would go
unprosecuted.225 It reasoned that this was “unrelated” to the preemption
inquiry and that, in any event, class-wide proceedings are unfair to corporate
defendants as they result in “in terrorem” settlements with the sheer size of
class proceedings compelling defendants to settle “questionable claims.”226
In practice, Concepcion gutted the FAA’s savings clause. Lower courts now
have little room to find an arbitration clause unconscionable; doing so would
have to be squared with the Court’s order that state law must not “stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”227
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,228 the Court eliminated
the one last refuge for prospective plaintiffs—that arbitration must allow a
plaintiff to effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights.
While
Concepcion involved preemption of state law claims, Italian Colors
implicated claims arising under federal antitrust law. The plaintiff restaurant,
Italian Colors, alleged that American Express had unlawfully leveraged its
monopoly power in charge cards to force merchants to accept its high-cost
credit cards.229 While the parties’ contract contained an arbitration clause,
the plaintiff argued that the dispute was not subject to arbitration because
compulsion to arbitral forum would prevent the plaintiff from vindicating its
220
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federal statutory rights.230 In its opposition to the defendant’s motion to
compel arbitration, the plaintiff submitted a declaration from an economist
estimating that the costs of proving plaintiff’s claim would be “at least
several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,” while the
maximum recovery would be only $38,549.231
The Court held that the purported “effective vindication” exception was
mere dictum in Mitsubishi Motors, on which the Court subsequently declined
to rely on to invalidate arbitration agreements, and the same result was
necessary in the case before it as “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”232 In reaching
its conclusion, the Court relied on the broad language extolling the virtues of
arbitration in Concepcion that purportedly are embodied in the FAA.233
Justice Kagan, authoring a dissent for three justices, called the decision a
“betrayal of our precedents, and of federal statutes like the antitrust laws,”234
adding that: “In the hands of today’s majority, arbitration threatens to
become . . . a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious
federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”235
Today, when a large number of potential plaintiffs have been commonly
defrauded by comparatively small amounts, the pursuit of private
enforcement is usually futile with the presence of a bilateral arbitration
clause. In light of the expected benefits, the costs of individual arbitrations
are prohibitive.236 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s study on the
effects of arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts confirms this
economic logic. Across six major consumer finance markets in which tens of
millions of Americans participate, the CFPB reported that in 2010 and 2011
only fifty-two individual arbitration claims for less than $1,000 were filed
and that just four of these claimants obtained relief.237 It is unsurprising that
large civil defense firms specify the “potential elimination” of mass
accountability as the principal benefit of arbitration for their corporate
clients.238
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IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS SOUGHT TO DEVELOP PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT, BUT DEFERENCE TO U.S. INDUSTRY RHETORIC HAS IMPEDED
REAL CHANGE
While the Supreme Court has subverted private rights of action in the
United States, European Union institutions have taken a number of steps over
the past fifteen years to develop the private enforcement of public law, with
an emphasis on antitrust law.239 Traditionally, the European Union and its
Member States placed public institutions at the center of their law
enforcement regimes.240 Private enforcement has been underdeveloped and
largely existed as an afterthought. Breaking with this historical norm, the
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), in a series of decisions since 2001, has
held that victims of antitrust violations have a right to seek damages and also
lowered procedural obstacles to private antitrust suits.241 In contrast to its
American counterpart’s hostility toward private rights of action across all
areas of law, the European Union’s highest court has aimed to encourage
private enforcement in antitrust in particular.
The European Union has enacted rules to effectuate private rights of
action. Seeking to protect public rights broadly, the European Commission
(“EC”) issued a non-binding recommendation in June 2013 on collective
actions applicable to areas such as antitrust, consumer protection, and
financial services.242 Building on the ECJ’s more narrowly-focused rulings,
the European Council enacted a binding directive on private antitrust
enforcement in November 2014.243 This directive establishes a basic
procedural framework for facilitating antitrust damages actions. European
Union Member States were given two years to establish these enumerated
rules as national law.244 While the antitrust-specific directive includes a
number of positive elements, the more general recommendation has two
critical deficiencies—opt-in collective actions and restrictions on third-party
financing—that are almost guaranteed to yield inadequate private
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enforcement.
In developing its recommendation, the EC credited the tort reform
narrative in the United States and repeatedly stated the need to prevent
“abusive litigation” in Europe.245 Yet, this concern is based on a false
portrayal of the civil justice process in the United States. The so-called
excesses do not reflect reality and are the product of a distorted historical
record.
A. The European Court of Justice Recognizes and Promotes Private
Rights of Action, in Particular in Antitrust Law
Although European countries have relied extensively on government
action to protect citizens, European Union law has long formally recognized
private rights of action as well. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union states that “everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy.”246
In a 1963 decision, the ECJ held that an article of the EU’s foundational
treaty “must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating individual
rights which national courts must protect.”247 From a policy perspective, the
ECJ has stated that private rights of action complement public enforcement
and deter illegal conduct.248 In a series of decisions starting in 2001, the ECJ
articulated principles governing antitrust private damages actions in the
national courts of the Member States. These decisions catalyzed an
appreciable shift in the approach of the European Union to private
enforcement more generally.
In its 2001 decision in Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, the ECJ held that the
victims of antitrust violations have a right to pursue actions for damages.249
Crehan was the owner of a pub in the United Kingdom.250 As part of his
lease, he was required to serve only beer produced by Courage.251 After he
was sued for violating this term of the lease, Crehan filed a counterclaim for
damages in English court.252 He alleged that the tying arrangement that
required him to serve only Courage’s beer as a condition of his lease was a
violation of European antitrust law and hurt the profitability of his
business.253 In deciding several questions of European Union law referred to
it by the English High Court, the ECJ held that Crehan had a right to obtain
damages if he could establish an antitrust violation and show that the
violation caused the damages he suffered.254 It stated that EU law created
245
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rights for individuals and that the national courts “must ensure that those
rules take full effect and must protect the rights which they confer on
individuals.”255 The ECJ also observed that a failure to permit private
enforcement would undermine “the full effectiveness” of European antitrust
law.256 According to the ECJ, damages actions play an important deterrence
role and “can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective
competition in the [European] Community.”257
The ECJ’s next major pronouncement on private rights of action under
antitrust law was in Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA.258 The
Italian competition authority had found that the defendant insurance
companies had engaged in illegal information sharing as a means of fixing
rates on domestic auto insurance policies.259 The claimants filed suit seeking
to recover damages for the overcharges arising from this conspiracy.260 In
affirming the importance of private enforcement, the ECJ recited the
compensation and deterrence benefits from Crehan.261 Importantly, it ruled
that private parties could rely on findings of antitrust violations by the
national and European competition authorities in pursuing their claims.262 In
other words, these decisions would have preclusive effect, and private parties
would only have to establish a causal connection between the violation and
their injuries. In addition, the court held that parties can seek damages for
both overcharges and lost profits.263 While Manfredi did not endorse
exemplary or punitive damages, it did not foreclose this option either.264
Although they enshrined private rights of action in EU law, the Crehan
and Manfredi decisions left the implementation of private enforcement to the
European Union Member States. Manfredi stated that “[i]t is for the
domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and
tribunals having jurisdiction to hear actions for damages based on an
infringement of the Community competition rules and to prescribe the
detailed procedural rules governing those actions[.]”265 This discretion is
subject to two important limitations. First, the procedures cannot be less
favorable for actions under EU law than they are for similar actions under
national law—or the principle of equivalence.266 Second, the procedures
cannot “render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of
255
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the right to seek compensation”—or the principle of effectiveness.267
In recent years, the ECJ has articulated additional principles that
encourage private antitrust enforcement. In Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis
NV, it affirmed that national courts must treat the EC’s antitrust decisions as
binding and cannot issue conflicting decisions.268 And it has also broadened
the scope of damages that claimants can recover.269
B. The European Commission Has Taken an Important Step Toward
Developing Effective Private Antitrust Enforcement
In November 2014, the European Council enacted a directive that
establishes a basic framework for the private enforcement of European
antitrust law.270 The directive sets out procedural rules that Member States
must incorporate into national law within two years.271 Through this
directive, the EC has laid significant, albeit imperfect, building blocks for an
effective system of private antitrust litigation.
1. Procedural Requirements for Private Antitrust Enforcement in the
EU Member States
The directive lays out a discovery process. It establishes the right of
claimants to obtain evidence from defendants and third parties.272 Courts
should order defendants and third parties to disclose relevant evidence
provided that a claimant has “a reasoned justification containing reasonably
available facts and evidence to support the plausibility of its claim for
damages.”273 The disclosure obligation is subject to a proportionality test.274
If defendants fail to comply or destroy relevant evidence, the directive
requires courts to impose penalties, including applying legal presumptions in
favor of the claimant and ordering the payment of legal costs.275
The directive confers binding authority on the decisions of national
competition authorities and sets out a long statute of limitations period. If a
national competition authority finds a violation of antitrust law, courts in that
267
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jurisdiction are directed to hold that a violation has been “irrefutably
established for the purposes for an action for damages.”276 With respect to
decisions in other Member States, courts should accord them a high degree of
deference and apply them “as at least prima facie evidence that an
infringement of antitrust law has occurred.”277 The directive requires
Member States to establish a limitations period of no less than five years that
does not begin to run until a claimant “knows, or can reasonably be expected
to know” that an infringement has occurred and caused him or her harm. 278
Defendants are also subject to joint and several liability. A defendant in
an antitrust action is liable for the entire harm arising from the alleged
violation, including the harm inflicted by other participants in the illegal
activity.279 For damages above and beyond those attributed to its conduct, a
defendant can seek compensation from its co-conspirators.280 Antitrust
violators that have received leniency from a competition authority for
reporting cartel conduct are immune from joint and several liability.281
On the question of passing-on of overcharges from illegal conduct, the
European Union has parted ways with federal law in the United States. All
purchasers—regardless of whether they purchased directly from the antitrust
violator or an intermediary—are entitled to seek damages.282 This indirect
purchaser standing distinguishes European law from federal law in the
United States, where the Supreme Court has held that the antitrust laws grant
consumer standing only to direct purchasers.283 At the same time, defendants
can invoke the passing-on of illegal overcharges as a defense against direct
purchasers;284 this is also contrary to federal precedent in the United States,
which prohibits this defense.285 A defendant in Europe is entitled to a
commensurate reduction in damages to direct purchasers if it shows that the
overcharge was passed through to downstream customers in the form of
higher prices.286
The directive provides some guidance on damages.287 It restricts
276
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Member States from establishing legal standards for damages that makes
damages actions “practically impossible or excessively difficult.”288 In the
context of cartel conduct, a presumption of harm is automatically
established.289 But for other antitrust claims, no such presumption exists.
2. A Positive, But Imperfect, Enactment
The directive is an important step forward and represents real progress
toward creating effective private antitrust enforcement. Several provisions
raise the expected benefits and reduce the costs of litigation. They increase
the likelihood that ordinary citizens will be able to vindicate their economic
rights in court. Nonetheless, it has a notable weakness that could hurt private
actions and diminish the deterrence of anticompetitive behavior.
Two articles of the directive raise the expected benefits from a private
antitrust claim. Article 11 establishes joint and several liability for antitrust
violations.290 Per this provision, a claimant “has the right to require full
compensation from any [defendant] until he has been fully compensated.”291
By allowing a claimant to recover its entire damage from a single defendant,
joint and several liability raises the expected benefits from a single lawsuit.
Without joint and several liability, a plaintiff is permitted to recover only the
damages specifically attributed to each defendant.
Article 12 confers standing on all consumers—those who purchased the
affected products directly and indirectly from the antitrust violators.292 By
granting standing to indirect purchasers, the directive permits them to recover
damages for the overcharges they had to bear because of upstream antitrust
law infringements.293 In the absence of this rule, indirect purchasers would
not have standing to recover and would have an expected benefit of zero
from antitrust litigation. In the United States, for example, federal antitrust
law denies standing to indirect purchasers. The Illinois Brick rule holds that
only direct purchasers have the right to pursue consumer antitrust claims.294
This narrower standing rule not only reduces the expected benefits for
indirect purchasers—it eliminates them entirely.
The directive has multiple provisions that reduce the costs of uncovering
antitrust law violations. Article 5 provides for proportionate discovery if a
claimant presents “a reasoned justification containing reasonably available
facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of its claim for
damages.”295 Provided these conditions are met, national courts must order
“the defendant or a third party to disclose relevant evidence which lies in
288

Id. art. 16(2).
Id. art. 16(1).
290
Id. art. 11.
291
Id. art. 11(1).
292
Id. art. 12.
293
European Council Directive 2013/0185, art. 14(1).
294
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
295
European Council Directive 2013/0185, art. 5(1).
289

2015

A VIEW ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

343

their control.”296 Article 10 establishes a minimum limitation period of five
years.297 And the limitation period does not begin until the plaintiff knows or
reasonably could know that a violation of antitrust law has occurred, that this
violation has caused harm to the plaintiff, and the identity of the violator.298
These two provisions reduce the costs of investigation for claimants.
Plaintiffs are not expected to undertake extraordinary pre-trial investigations
on their own to uncover violations, nor are they required to uncover
violations in an unreasonably short period of time.
Plaintiffs face lower litigation costs under the directive’s rules of issue
preclusion. If a national competition authority decision has found an
antitrust violation, courts in that country are required to hold that a violation
has been “irrefutably established for the purposes for an action for
damages.”299 And courts in other EU nations are required to treat this
decision “as at least prima facie evidence that a violation of antitrust law has
occurred.”300 These two rules relieve plaintiffs of the burden of relitigating
and proving allegations that the public authorities have already found to be
true. And Article 17 establishes a presumption of harm from collusion.301
Consequently, plaintiffs in cartel cases do not have to show that they suffered
harm from this illegal conduct.
At the same time, the directive has a notable weakness. While all injured
parties (whether they are direct or indirect purchasers) are granted standing,
defendants are entitled to invoke the passing-on defense to damages.302
Intermediate buyers when forced to pay overcharges on products due to
cartelistic or other anticompetitive behavior can sometimes pass these higher
prices, in large measure, on to customers. With the availability of a passingon defense, defendants can reduce their damages to direct purchasers to the
extent that direct purchasers passed the illegal overcharges through to their
customers.303 The passing-on defense can harm the compensation and
deterrence function of private enforcement.304 Because it reduces damages to
direct purchasers, this defense lowers their anticipated recovery (the expected
benefit from legal action), making a lawsuit less attractive and harming
overall deterrence. The U.S. experience suggests that indirect purchasers
cannot be expected to carry a significant part of the enforcement burden and
fully offset reduced enforcement by direct purchasers. In most EU nations,
this deficiency is compounded by the procedural obstacles to collective
296
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actions.305
C. Notwithstanding the Progress Embodied in the Directive, the
Recommendation on Collective Actions Has Significant, Arguably Fatal,
Deficiencies
In June 2013, the European Commission issued a non-binding
recommendation on collective actions that Member States should enact into
law.306 This statement sets out basic procedures for group litigation. In
contrast to the many strengths of the directive, the recommendation imposes
significant burdens on class actions and will likely ensure that they are
pursued infrequently, if at all.
1. “Best Practices” for Group Litigation of Antitrust and Other
Claims
The EC’s recommendation is non-binding and only states that Member
States “should” enact them into national law within two years.307 It presents
model procedural rules for all the important questions that govern a system
of collective private rights of action, including the availability, operation, and
funding of group litigation mechanisms. Like the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in the United States, these rules are trans-substantive and intended
to cover a number of areas of law.308
The recommendation confers standing on both natural persons and
“qualified entities.”309 Qualified entities should be designated by Member
States to bring actions on behalf of individuals.310 They should be non-profit
in character, work on matters related to the alleged legal violation, and have
the capacity to represent multiple injured parties.311 To facilitate collective
litigation against illegal conduct that has effects in multiple Member States,
national rules should not discriminate against litigants, including qualified
organizations, from other EU nations.312
305
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In a nod to the class certification process in the United States, the EC
calls for an admissibility procedure.313 Courts in the Member States should
examine proposed collective actions for their suitability for litigation on a
group basis.314 Cases in which “conditions for collective actions are not met”
or “manifestly unfounded cases” should be terminated.315
Opt-in actions are established as the norm for collective litigation.
Parties should be required to affirm expressly that they consent to
representation by the named litigant.316 They should be permitted to join or
leave the action at “any time before the judgment is given or the case is
otherwise validly settled.”317 Because opt-in actions are set out as the
presumptive rule, any exception “should be duly justified by reasons or
sound administration of justice.”318 To facilitate opt-in actions, the
recommendation states that Member States should allow for the broad
dissemination of information concerning the alleged legal violation and the
proposed collective litigation.319
The recommendation has several provisions for litigation funding and
endorses a number of restrictions in this area. Litigants are obligated to
disclose the source of their funding at the beginning of proceedings.320
Courts should stay the case if a third-party funder has a conflict of interest
with the claimant, or cannot meet its financial obligations to the claimant, or
if the claimant cannot cover the costs of the opposing party in the event of an
adverse outcome.321
The recommendation bars contingency fee
arrangements with attorneys under ordinary circumstances.322 Contingency
fee arrangements with third parties are also prohibited unless they are subject
to government oversight.323 And these parties are not allowed to influence
the plaintiff’s litigation strategy.324 The “loser-pays” rule in litigation is
endorsed, which, as the name suggests, means the losing party covers the
costs of the winning party.325
The recommendation prohibits punitive and other non-compensatory
damages. Damages should be limited to the actual harm suffered by the
group members.326 This restriction is justified on the basis of avoiding
“overcompensation in favor of the claimant party.”327
The Member States are directed to encourage settlement and alternative
313
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dispute resolution.328 Settlement should be promoted before and during the
trial.329 Member States should also encourage collective alternative dispute
settlement mechanisms based on the parties’ consent.330
2. The Recommendation Lays Out Model Procedural Rules That
Frustrate Collective Litigation
While the directive is an important step forward, the recommendation
promotes counterproductive mechanisms for collective litigation in antitrust
and other areas of law. It endorses opt-in mechanisms for group actions and
restricts the means of funding these litigations. As a result, unless the
Member States enact provisions that contradict the principles of the EC’s
recommendation, private rights of action are likely to remain a dead letter for
ordinary Europeans.
a. Strong Presumption in Favor of Opt-In and Against Opt-Out
Collective Actions
The recommendation perpetuates the status quo of ineffective private
enforcement.
Because opt-in actions do not permit the efficient
consolidation of a large number of small claims, they reduce the expected
benefits from litigation. Accordingly, the opt-in requirement discourages the
filing of claims on behalf of a large number of injured parties. Consumers
and small businesses typically have small, or even negative, value legal
claims. For them, the continued reliance on opt-in mechanisms means that
the rights recognized by the European Court of Justice in Crehan and
Manfredi will be difficult to vindicate. Opt-in mechanisms are ineffective in
providing redress for injured parties and also deterring illegal behavior.
The choice between opt-in and opt-out actions has proven to be critical
around the world. Opt-in actions place the onus on individuals to participate.
Individuals must either file their own action before they are consolidated into
a group action or take an affirmative decision to join an already initiated
collective action.331 In contrast, under opt-out actions, the class of injured
parties is broadly defined332—for example, all New Yorkers who purchased
butter between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2005. Parties that do not opt
out are bound by any final judgment or settlement.333
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Opt-in actions have had a disappointing record in practice. In most
European jurisdictions that presently provide for group litigation, opt-in
actions are the principal form of collective redress mechanism.334 For the
most part, opt-in rates have been low,335 rendering the legal action
uneconomical. Individuals have failed to opt-in for a number of reasons.
These include unfamiliarity with the case, lack of interest in vindicating a
small claim, inertia, distrust of the legal process, and fear of affiliation with
litigation perceived as controversial.336 An analysis of thirty-seven group
litigations in England found that thirty-two cases had an opt-in rate below
fifty percent, and eight cases had a rate below one percent.337 Of course, optin rates have not been universally low. Some actions involving a large
number of potential members have witnessed opt-in rates as high as ninety
percent.338 Higher opt-in records have been seen in employment litigation,339
in which individual damages are often quite large. Even in this area,
however, low opt-in rates are the norm. In the United States, the Fair Labor
Standards Act deviates from the opt-out norm and expressly requires opt-in
class actions.340 Opt-in rates have typically been low, weakening the
enforcement of federal wage-and-hour law.341
A representative action brought by the British consumer organization
Which? illustrates the shortcomings of opt-in class actions. The Office of
Fair Trading (“OFT”) had found that JJB Sports, a leading sports retailer in
the UK, had coerced Umbro, a maker of sporting gear, into imposing resale
price maintenance on the England national team and Manchester United
jerseys in the months leading up to the Euro 2000 soccer tournament.342
Resale price maintenance prohibited retailers from discounting these jerseys
and forced consumers to pay higher prices than they would have in a
competitive market.343 English law permits qualified entities to bring followon actions in antitrust matters in the Competition Appeal Tribunal.344
Following the OFT’s decision, Which? brought a follow-on action in the
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Competition Appeal Tribunal, seeking damages on behalf of British
consumers who had purchased English national or Manchester United jerseys
in 2000.345
The results of the follow-on action were disappointing. Up to a million
people may have purchased jerseys subject to the illegal price maintenance
scheme.346 Because UK law at the time provided only for opt-in actions,
Which? had to solicit consumers to join the litigation.347 Despite an
aggressive publicity campaign,348 the action attracted just 130 participants,349
an opt-in rate of below one percent.350 Which? incurred significant legal
costs in this unsuccessful effort,351 raising serious doubts as to whether it
would pursue a follow-on antitrust action again so long as the opt-in rule
remained in effect.352
Low opt-in rates are troubling on multiple grounds. First, if many parties
are failing to participate due to a lack of knowledge or interest, private rights
of action fail to fulfill their compensatory function. On net, injured parties
are uncompensated for the harms that they have suffered. In many cases, the
individual damages may be small so the lost compensation could be
dismissed as a minor concern. Private enforcement, however, serves an
important role in deterring illegal conduct—a role arguably more important
than its compensatory one. The European Court of Justice has recognized
that private damages actions can protect competitive markets.353 When optin rates are low, lawbreakers are allowed to keep their ill-gotten gains.
In sharp contrast to opt-in collective actions, opt-out collective actions
typically see high participation rates. Just as few people choose to opt in to
litigation, very few choose to opt out of them. In addition to the United
States, other nations with opt-out actions include Australia, Canada,
Denmark, and Portugal.354 The Netherlands has an opt-out settlement
procedure but no opt-out collective actions.355 An empirical study of opt-out
litigation under federal law in the United States and in the Australian state of
Victoria has found median opt-out rates of 0.2 percent and 13 percent,
respectively.356 Opt-out rates have been comparably low in the Netherlands
345
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and Portugal.357 In other words, the overwhelming majority of affected
individuals generally take no action and remain passive members of opt-out
group litigation.358
Opt-out actions help spread the costs of litigation among a large pool of
plaintiffs. On an individual basis, consumer claims often have a small or
even negative value—the costs of litigation exceed the expected recovery.
As a result, claim consolidation is essential for the vindication of many
consumer rights.359 From a benefit-cost perspective, opt-out actions raise the
expected benefits of litigation because they combine thousands—sometimes
even millions—of small claims into a single action. Since a sizable fraction
of litigation costs are fixed or do not increase in lockstep with the number of
class members, an opt-out mechanism can convert countless small or
negative value claims into a single attractive claim.360 In contrast, opt-in
actions ordinarily attract far fewer participants and do not permit the
effective consolidation of individual legal claims.
Furthermore, opt-out class actions promote judicial efficiency and legal
certainty for defendants. By sweeping a large number of individual claims
into a single action, opt-out litigation greatly reduces the number of parallel
actions in court.361 And this consolidation of numerous individual claims
also offers legal comfort to defendants. Once an opt-out action has been
resolved, defendants can identify the maximum number of future individual
claims based on the number of parties that opted out.362 And, as indicated
earlier, opt-out rates tend to be very low.
b. Restrictions on Third-Party Funding and Support for the Loser-Pays
Rule
Through its onerous restrictions on litigation funding, the EC’s
recommendation starves collective actions of the necessary resources. It
prohibits contingency fee arrangements between clients and lawyers and also
heavily restricts contingency fee agreements with third parties. The lack of a
funding provision combined with the backdrop of two-way fee shifting
renders group litigation much less feasible.
Given that litigation, especially collective litigation, entails significant
upfront expenditures,363 funding is critical to plaintiffs. In most instances,
357
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ordinary consumers will be either unable or unwilling to foot the bill of
litigation. And qualified entities, barring extraordinary public support, are
not likely to have the necessary means either.364 In an opt-in environment,
the possibility of having to cover the costs of litigation will only further drive
down the already low participation rates. For consumers, a lack of financing
will, in practice, mean that few, if any, claims are brought on their behalf.
Modern antitrust cases, for example, are costly for a number of reasons.
For one, they often involve analysis of complicated economic questions on
whether the defendant’s conduct was, on net, harmful to competition and
consumers. As private antitrust litigation in the United States has shown,
these cases entail extensive discovery and also the retention of business and
economic experts.365 And even in follow-on actions in which a national
competition authority has already found a violation, claimants are
responsible for quantifying damages.
The bar on contingency fee arrangements between clients and lawyers
deprives collective actions of an obvious source of funding. Unlike ordinary
consumers, enterprising lawyers are willing to cover the upfront costs of
litigation.366 In exchange for a percentage of any final award or settlement,
lawyers can pay filing fees, conduct discovery, and retain experts. If the
claim is unsuccessful, the lawyer receives nothing. This fee arrangement
shifts the risk of litigation to lawyers. In the United States, “[e]ssentially
all . . . class actions are funded with contingent fees.”367 In addition,
contingency fee arrangements encourage lawyers to screen potential claims
carefully—it is in their interest to spend time and money only on matters that
are likely to result in a significant recovery and thereby significant fees.368
The recommendation also restricts contingency fee arrangements with
non-attorneys. In jurisdictions where contingency fees with lawyers are
restricted, third-party litigation funders have been the lifeblood of private
rights of action. In Australia and the United Kingdom, in particular,
specialized litigation financing firms have emerged in recent decades.369
These firms agree to cover the costs of litigation in return for a percentage of
any damage awards.370
This system is similar to contingent fee
arrangements, except that a third-party firm performs the financing function
in place of the plaintiffs’ attorney. While the recommendation does not
proscribe such fee arrangements, its restrictions on funders’ ability to
364
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influence plaintiffs’ litigation strategy are likely to deter prospective
litigation financiers. This insistence on funder passivity may not preclude
third-party financing, but it could limit funding to only the strongest legal
claims.371 Funders, much like plaintiffs’ lawyers in the United States who
finance cases, would likely want to have some control over decisions that
could affect whether the suit they support succeeds in court and whether they
recover their upfront costs.
Portugal’s experience shows how the absence of a funding mechanism
can render even a liberal opt-out system impotent. Portugal is one of the few
European nations that has an opt-out rule for group actions.372 Individuals
and organizations certified by the government have the right to bring opt-out
consumer and other collective claims, which Portuguese law calls a “popular
action.”373 DECO, Portugal’s leading consumer organization, is most closely
identified with popular actions.374 Since the opt-out rule was established in
1995, however, DECO has brought only a few popular actions on behalf of
Portuguese consumers.375 Although DECO appears interested in using the
legal process more aggressively,376 the group is unable to do so due to the
high costs of litigation.377 In the absence of a funding mechanism, the optout popular actions are unlikely to be feasible on a large-scale.
In addition, the recommendation endorses the loser-pay rules and thereby
compounds the difficulties associated with litigation financing.378 Per this
rule, the party that loses a case is required to cover the other party’s legal
costs. A plaintiff that is unsuccessful in a legal action will typically be
ordered to pay the defendant’s legal expenses, which in some instances could
amount to hundreds of thousands of euros. The loser pays rule is intended to
deter “frivolous” lawsuits, but it could go too far in the other direction. Few
lawsuits are guaranteed to produce victories so the threat of covering a
defendant’s fees could discourage even meritorious claims.379 When parties
have to fund their own legal actions and also face the risk of paying their
adversary’s legal expenses, the “chilling effect” on private suits can be
significant and perhaps fatal.380
371
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c. The Restriction on Non-Compensatory Damages: A Secondary Flaw
The EC’s recommendation has another provision that further diminishes
the attractiveness of private lawsuits: it seeks to restrict damages to no
greater than compensatory damages, signaling that the EC views treble and
punitive damages with hostility.
The recommendation’s strict requirement that claimants obtain only
compensatory damages could hurt private enforcement. Capping damages at
a compensatory level decreases the expected benefits from litigation and
diminishes the incentive for parties to file claims. It also risks underdeterrence of harmful behavior. In many areas of law, in which illegal
conduct is likely to go undetected at times, optimal deterrence requires more
than just compensatory damages.381 It is telling that even the mandatory
treble damages under federal U.S. antitrust law appear to be inadequate for
deterrence.382
To be sure, this ceiling on damages is not nearly as problematic as the
EC’s insistence on opt-in actions and hostility to third-party financing
mechanisms. In many cases, compensatory damages can provide strong
incentive to bring class actions. And importantly for deterrence purposes,
private damages actions should not be examined in a vacuum. Public and
private sanctions need to be viewed together because stronger public
penalties can offset more limited private relief.383
D. The Influence of the American “Tort Reform” Narrative and Business
Victimhood Mythology on the European Commission Is Apparent—and
Unfortunate
Any neutral observer ought to wonder why the European Union was so
timid in its recommendation. Unfortunately, the European Union has a
history of developing policy by shadow boxing with the United States and its
allegedly out-of-control litigation culture384—a mentality that U.S. industry
has cultivated and promoted.385 Examples abound of EU policymakers and
official bodies accepting and propagating American industry’s business
381
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victimhood mythology. European Union regulators have cautioned about
“U.S.-style excesses,”386 while Member State departments have warned of
“exposing business to spurious or vexatious claims or unwittingly creat[ing]
a compensation culture.”387 Even modest proposals are couched in a
defensive posture. For instance, the former EU competition commissioner
reassured a skeptical audience that she had “left [her] cowboy hat at home”
and that reforms would not bring about a U.S.-style system.388 As Hannah
Buxbaum has written, “a specific antagonism toward the U.S. class action
system—not merely a desire to craft an indigenous version of collective
actions—has become a backdrop to European law reform.”389
A review of the EC documents published before the directive confirms
that the business victimhood narrative in the United States has influenced—
and ultimately hurt—the European private enforcement project. Together
with the 2013 recommendation, the EC published a communication to other
EU bodies that lays out the rationale for its policy choices.390 The
communication notes the need to prevent “abusive litigation”391 and states
that defendants may feel pressure to settle cases “only in order to prevent or
minimize possible damage.”392 Citing a resolution of the European
Parliament, this document stresses the need to “fight[] abusive litigation”393
through the exclusion of “punitive damages, third-party financing of
collective redress, and contingency fees for lawyers.”394 It also states that
opt-out procedures enhance the abusive potential of class actions.395 Private
enforcement in the United States is described as “an illustration of the
vulnerability of a system to abusive litigation.”396 Indicative of the deep
influence of the United States industry narrative on European lawmakers, the
communication credits recent Supreme Court decisions for restricting class
actions “in view of the detrimental economic and legal effects of a system
that is open to abuse by frivolous litigation.”397
The EC’s 2008 white paper on Damages Actions for Antitrust Violations
386
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sounds many of the same themes.398 This document proposed rules for
creating an effective private enforcement mechanism, and the recent
directive and recommendation, described above, incorporated many of the
outlined proposals. The white paper rejected a number of procedural options
that an earlier green paper had put forth for consideration.399 For example,
the white paper stated that compensation, not deterrence, should be the
principal aim of damages actions.400 On this basis, EC rejected the
possibility of double damages for injured parties and touted the superiority of
opt-in actions over opt-out actions.401
Along with the white paper, the EC published two documents that offer
insights on its approach to private antitrust enforcement: a staff working
paper and impact assessment report.402 These publications refer to the risk of
“excesses” from a private enforcement system.403 They reflect a tension
between providing for effective private rights of action and also protecting
against litigation “abuse.” For example, the working paper states that
collective redress is important “for access to justice.”404 Yet, in the next
clause, it observes that “excesses . . . have been reported from other
jurisdictions.”405 In evaluating the particular procedural options in the green
paper, the impact assessment report rejects the most aggressive set of rules—
for example, opt-out actions and double damages—for similar reasons. It
worries about the risk of “excesses” and the growth of a “litigation culture”
in Europe.406
Moreover, the document states that a strong private
enforcement regime could discourage pro-consumer conduct by dominant
firms.407
Remarkably, the Commission elevated the supposed American
experience over homegrown practice.
In 2008, the Commission
acknowledged that excesses had not been reported in the two European
jurisdictions that then had opt-out systems: the Netherlands and Portugal.408
Even as it distinguished U.S. legal culture and rules from its European
counterparts, the working paper underscored the need to establish rules that
398
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“serve as effective safeguards against misuse of the system.”409 It notes that
in combination with other procedural rules, “opt-out actions have in other
jurisdictions been perceived to lead to excesses,”410 including plaintiffs’
attorneys assuming control of a case and profiting at the expense of
claimants.411 Notably, the Office of Fair Trading, while crediting these
tropes in the American context, discounted the threat of a “U.S. style
litigation culture” arising from opt-out actions in the United Kingdom.412
The European Commission has embraced a narrative on the American
tort system that is fundamentally false. This story of excess is not based on
empirical fact.413 Rather, it relies almost exclusively on distorted anecdotes
and misrepresentations of recent history.414 In reality, the tort system has
been an important means of compensating victims and deterring socially
harmful behavior. In a number of areas, Americans suffer from a deficit of
private enforcement, not the publicized—and false—surfeit, because
businesses still find it profitable to break the law.415
The “exporting” of the U.S. tort reform story to the European Union is
unfortunate for European consumers and small businesses. With its reflexive
acceptance of themes propagated by American opponents of private rights of
action, the EC has stunted private enforcement mechanisms. The European
framework embodied in the recent directive and, in particular, the
recommendation does not have the features necessary for small claims to be
vindicated. Fortunately, Member States still have the discretion to go beyond
what the recommendation and directive require. Some EU nations have
already established superior aggregate litigation mechanisms, and others
have expressed an interest in doing so. But of course, other Member States
will enact only the minimum procedures necessary to comply with EU
dictates. When he wrote his famous memo in 1971, Lewis Powell probably
did not foresee his work shaping policy on both sides of the Atlantic.
V. TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON OF ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS: SOME
CONVERGENT TENDENCIES BUT CRITICAL DIFFERENCES WILL PERSIST OR
EMERGE
From a distant view, private enforcement systems in the United States
and European Union are on a trajectory of convergence. For the United
States, the once-strong private enforcement regime is weakening at a
troubling pace. While private enforcement in some areas remains resilient,
courts are whittling away at the regime’s overall vigor. In particular,
expansive application of the Federal Arbitration Act and imposition of
409
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heightened class certification standards have presented grave problems.416
Meanwhile, the largely ineffectual private enforcement systems of EU
Member States are gradually improving as they enact procedural
requirements of the EU recommendation and directive into national law,
which will bolster private enforcement in antitrust law.417 The main
obstacles will be the absence of mechanisms for financing litigation and the
presence of opt-in, rather than opt-out, group actions. Yet, uniformity is
unlikely to be the result because the EU recommendation establishes only
general principles to be enacted into law at the national level. Some
European nations, including Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the
United Kingdom, have already taken steps to meet the challenges.418
In the medium term, the trajectories of the private enforcement systems
in the United States and European Union also point to functional
convergence. The nature of the challenges that both are likely to face also
suggests that the systems will come to share certain features and flaws. Two
likely developments warrant discussion. First, private enforcement systems
in both the United States and European Union will have difficulty
accommodating the adjudication of low-value individual claims. Second, the
incentive structure in both systems will encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to
attempt to amass and litigate claims of medium and high value in hopes of
entering a global, opt-out settlement. A company’s willingness to enter into
a global, opt-out settlement will hinge on whether it faces sufficient exposure
from individual lawsuits.
A. Convergence in the Medium Term: A Struggle to Accommodate LowValue Claims
The U.S.’s opt-out class action system was once designed for regulating
bad practices that cause a small amount of loss at the individual level, but
result in significant damages on an aggregate scale.419 The new rigors of
class certification420 and proliferation of arbitration clauses,421 however, have
undermined this function. Similarly, in European countries, the lack of optout class action systems422 and viable methods of litigation finance423 will
mean that few, if any, attorneys will bear the risk of filing suit on low-value
claims.
In the United States, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
erected two major procedural barriers to class actions in recent years. First,
the Court’s expansive interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act has
416
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empowered corporations to impose class action waivers on consumers. In
other words, businesses have virtual carte blanche to deprive consumers of
their right to bring class actions in court and insist that they pursue individual
arbitration to recover damages. In practice, mandatory individual arbitration
means few, if any, low-value legal claims will be pursued.424 Leaving aside
the possibility of government action, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”425
But even when they can escape mandatory bilateral arbitration, consumer
class actions will confront significant difficulties in seeking certification.
First, many federal courts are now requiring that plaintiffs, prior to
certification, present a method to ascertain the identities of class members
through objective criteria—a seemingly reasonable requirement but one that
is very difficult to satisfy in many consumers goods contexts.426 This
ascertainability requirement, particularly in its harsher iterations, eliminates
the possibility of almost all class actions involving inexpensive goods
because there is no method to individually identify the legions of consumers
who do not retain documentation (such as receipts) of low-value purchases.
Second, other class certification prerequisites imposed by the Supreme Court
require plaintiffs to present more evidence in an early stage of litigation,
which translates to higher costs and greater uncertainty.427 Plaintiffs have to
engage in factual discovery and retain experts to certify a class today.
Unduly high class certification standards can deter the filing of meritorious
claims.428
Despite these myriad vexing challenges, there will remain a thin band of
low-value suits that the U.S. system will be able to accommodate, even if it is
a struggle. These cases will involve interactions between consumers and
remote actors (such as product manufacturers) in which the parties are not in
privity and, therefore, cannot be bound by arbitration clauses. The cases will
also involve purchases for which there is ready documentation. A good
example, which satisfies both conditions, is a consumer who files a class
action suit concerning an automobile with a safety defect. The consumer
likely sustained substantial damages and is in contractual privity with the car
dealership, not the manufacturer.
Much like in the United States, consumer class actions will face serious
obstacles in Europe. Today, most European jurisdictions with collective
redress procedures have opt-in class action mechanisms,429 which the EU
recommendation reinforces. Because opt-in rates are generally very low,
424
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opt-in suits, whether brought by an individual or a qualified organization, are
not attractive from an economic perspective. And opt-in actions are only a
part of the problem. Even if opt-out mechanisms were enacted across the
EU, the general unavailability of contingent fee and third-party financing
arrangements, combined with a “loser pays” cost-shifting rule, would deter
group actions.430 External funding is essential for undertaking group
litigation, especially in cost-intensive areas such as antitrust.431
B. Convergence in the Medium Term: Inefficient Manual Aggregation of
Higher Value Claims to Strive for Global Settlements
When a common practice or policy causes mass harm, it is optimal that
mechanisms exist for mass accountability. As set forth above, however,
while both the United States and Europe will have class actions available on
the books, they will have limited real-world impact.
All hope for mass accountability will not be lost, however. Both the
United States and European Union have viable mechanisms to settle disputes
on a class-wide, opt-out basis, even if they cannot reliably be litigated in this
manner. In the United States, a settlement complaint that provides for a
national opt-out class action settlement can be prepared and judicially
approved. Although the traditional requirements for class certification apply
to the certification of classes for settlement, it is widely understood that the
requirements are far more lax than class certification for litigation
purposes.432 Similarly, the Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass
Damages (“WCAM”)433 enables an opt-out class settlement across the
European Union, and even the world.434 Under the WCAM, plaintiffs can
establish a special purpose foundation and enter into a settlement with a
defendant, which is binding on all parties who do not opt out.435
The challenge is that corporate defendants will not settle claims on an
aggregate basis out of the goodness of their hearts. Rather, they will need to
face sufficient exposure from meritorious litigation that they must “resort to”
the provision of en masse redress. This option can be attractive to a
wrongdoer confronted with the specter of death by a thousand separate
lawsuits. A classwide settlement gives the defendant total peace and
certainty: the corporation can pay a set amount to the universe of aggrieved
430
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at one time and terminate future legal claims.436 In contrast, a defendant with
the potential for large liability but with only a few small lawsuits on its hands
is unlikely to settle claims globally.
Accordingly, for the growing number of disputes that cannot be litigated
as opt-out class actions, but that nevertheless involve shared factual and legal
issues, plaintiffs’ attorneys in both the United States and Europe are likely to
execute similar litigation strategies. When possible, they will seek to amass
and litigate individual, or smaller group, claims in the hopes of compelling a
defendant to enter into a global opt-out settlement. In other words, attorneys
will build an inventory of clients with the same claims to litigate.
This strategy likely will not be viable for low-value individual claims.
First, those with small value claims will typically not care enough to litigate.
Second, even assuming that an attorney could assemble a very large number
of identical low-value (say, $20) claims, the overhead costs of managing the
inventory would often exceed the expected value of successful litigation or
arbitration. The defendant would also be unlikely to ever face sufficient
exposure to want to enter into a global settlement.437 For the plaintiffs, the
costs are simply too great and the likelihood of success too low.
The aggregation strategy could work when the individual claims are of
greater value, though. This is true even when the claims are subject to
bilateral arbitration. For example, in the United States in 2013, an opt-out
class action settlement was reached between Pennsylvania landowners and a
fracking company for claims arising from the alleged improper calculation of
royalty payments by the fracking company.438 Each agreement between the
fracking company and the purportedly thousand-plus landowners had a
bilateral arbitration agreement.439 However, because there were fourteen
named plaintiffs with high value claims, and because plaintiffs’ counsel
appeared capable of assembling a far greater number, the fracking company
felt sufficiently exposed to liability that it opted to enter into a multi-million
dollar class action settlement, rather than risk its chances with an
unforeseeable number of bilateral arbitrations.440 The plaintiffs’ lawyers
successfully assembled enough individual claims to compel the defendant to
settle on an aggregate basis.
Some plaintiffs’ lawyers in the United States have deployed the same
436

See Hausfeld & Ratner, supra note 352, at 545.
One possible exception will be in discrete instances in which individuals are so angered by
a bad corporate practice that they organize themselves and develop litigation workarounds.
For example, in 2014, an Austrian attorney received an outpouring of support for his efforts in
bringing suit against Facebook for privacy violations. See Loek Essers, As Facebook Privacy
Suit Reaches 25,000 Participant Target, Court is Still Unsure It Will Allow It, PC WORLD
(Aug. 6, 2014) http://www.pcworld.com/article/2462040/as-facebook-privacy-suit-reaches25000-participant-target-court-is-still-unsure-if-it-will-allow-it.html.
438
See Dan Packel, Chesapeake to Pay $7.5M to Settle Pa. Fracking Fees Action, LAW360
(Sep. 3, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/469430/chesapeake-to-pay-7-5m-to-settle-pafracking-fees-action.
439
See id.
440
Id.
437

360 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 14, No. 2
strategy in the employment context as well. After Concepcion, many
employers required their employees to sign bilateral arbitration agreements,
requiring the submission of employer-employee disputes to arbitration and
prohibiting class actions. When a dispute common to many employees has
arisen under those circumstances, plaintiffs’ attorneys have had success
signing up several individuals to prosecute separate arbitrations.441 In wageand-hour cases, for example, in which the value of individual claims can
amount to tens of thousands of dollars, defendants confront serious risks (and
costs in the form of arbitration and attorneys’ fees) if they were to fight these
cases individually, rather than settle globally.
The creative assembly of claims approach mirrors that employed in mass
tort cases in the U.S. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court effectively closed the
door on class actions with a strong personal injury component.442 For
example, class actions concerning exposure to asbestos or use of an unsafe
prescription drug can no longer be certified.443 Despite the inability to
proceed on a class-wide basis, the underlying facts in cases of this kind are
often common to large groups of people, each of whom may have suffered
debilitating losses. Consequently, attorneys litigating these cases assemble
large inventories, usually with the assistance of a cottage industry of lead
generation and referral firms. The law does not allow the settlement of these
claims on an opt-out basis, but the parties often reach a mass settlement for
the group of victims who have filed suit.444
In Europe, litigation barriers will compel plaintiffs’ lawyers to deploy a
similar strategy as in the United States. The absence of an opt-in class action
mechanism and the lack of viable litigation finance will prevent the effective
adjudication of low-value claims in Europe.
It will likely be a different story with medium and high value claims,
though. For example, imagine that there is a popular refrigerator throughout
Europe, which costs $1,500. The refrigerators have a design defect,
rendering them unusable after a few months of use. Assume that all EU
Member States incorporate opt-in class actions for consumer cases in the
near future, as encouraged by the EC’s 2013 recommendation on collective
redress. Because the individual claims are of high value and the product is
popular, an enterprising plaintiffs’ attorney would probably seek to sign up
plaintiffs and seed collective cases throughout the European Union. Once
the collective cases are off the ground and notice is disseminated to potential
owners of the refrigerators, the high value ($1,500) of the individual damages
would mean that a non-trivial number of individuals would likely opt in. The
441
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goal of the plaintiffs’ attorney would be to litigate the collective cases
successfully in different European countries until the defendant refrigerator
manufacturer sought complete peace by settling the case on an opt-out basis
throughout Europe, using WCAM in the Netherlands, for its fair value.445
In the coming years, in both the United States and Europe, there will
likely be a category of cases in which global, opt-out class resolution will be
possible. The scope of these cases will likely be narrow, however, as the
claims will have to be comparatively high in value to attract sufficient
individual participation, which will be rare. If a sufficient number of claims
are not aggregated, a defendant would not face adequate legal risk to enter
into such a settlement. This litigation process is also inefficient. The elegant
efficiency of the class action lies in its ability to resolve a large number of
common claims in one stroke. The manual aggregation model described here
is a far cry from that. Plaintiffs’ firms, who in the United States already
routinely experience cash-flow challenges, will have to dedicate significant
resources to procedural planning, which will be diverted from other
enforcement efforts.
C. Divergence of Private Enforcement Regimes in the Long Term: An
Ascendant EU?
Private enforcement in the United States is likely to remain fettered over
a longer time horizon. The Supreme Court has played the lead role in
weakening private enforcement. It has erected a series of procedural
obstacles against parties that seek to vindicate their rights.446 Unless the
Court’s composition moves significantly to the left in the coming years, it is
hard to imagine how or why it would overturn its anti-private enforcement
decisions over the past few decades.
The vacancy on the Court created by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia
during a Democratic presidency has fueled speculation that dramatic change
could be on the horizon. There are reasons to be circumspect, however.
While over the past thirty years the conservative majority on the Court has
been consistent and assertive in its opposition to private enforcement, the
liberal minority has been inconsistent and modest in its support of private
enforcement. For example, Justice David Souter, who was considered to be
among the liberal bloc despite his appointment by a Republican president,
authored the majority opinion in the Twombly decision that ushered in the era
of heightened pleading requirements.447 And although Justice Kagan is
considered among the more vocal and eloquent advocates of private
enforcement on the Court, even she did not question the thirty-plus years of
arbitration precedent in her dissent in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant against the majority’s evisceration of the effective vindication
445
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doctrine.448
President Obama’s nomination of Court of Appeals Judge Merrick
Garland does not suggest that meaningful change is afoot, either. Judge
Garland signed on to an opinion with a particularly harsh reading of recent
class certification precedent that would require plaintiffs—at the class
certification stage—to prove that all putative class members were likely
injured by the defendant’s conduct.449 Fortunately, this interpretation has
been almost uniformly rejected by other judges at the district and appellate
levels.450 Unfortunately, if Judge Garland is confirmed, his endorsement of
stringent class certification standards does not inspire confidence that future
Supreme Court decisions will reinvigorate the American private enforcement
system. At best, some of the most far-reaching decisions concerning
arbitration may be modestly pared back, while other elements—heightened
pleading standards, termination of disputes at summary judgment and
onerous evidentiary burdens at class certification—will become entrenched.
The shift in Court composition does bring some good news. Barring a
Republican victory in the 2016 presidential election that results in a
conservative successor to Justice Scalia, it is now unlikely that the system
will continue to wither through, for example, Supreme Court adoption of a
strict ascertainability requirement for class actions451 or adoption of a
requirement for standing that a plaintiff plead an injury beyond violation of a
statute,452 which many previously feared to be around the corner.
While Congress can override the Supreme Court, the prospects of
positive legislative action are slim. Republicans, who in 2016 control both
houses of Congress, have been consistently hostile to private rights of action
in all areas of law.453 And even when the Democrats controlled Congress
and the White House in 2009 and 2010, they did little to reverse the prodefendant decisions of the Supreme Court.454 For example, despite high
hopes for undoing the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the Federal
448
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Arbitration Act,455 the Democratic Congress did not act.
In contrast to the bleak outlook in the United States, select European
states could implement more robust private enforcement procedures. The
implementation of the EC recommendation and EU directive is very likely to
produce disappointing results. This framework fails to provide the incentives
necessary for strong private enforcement by consumers and other diffuse
groups.456 Even with the directive and recommendation, however, EU
Member States still retain significant discretion over procedure, meaning the
current diversity of systems is likely to persist and even grow. Some
Member States already provide for opt-out class actions or settlements and
third-party funding of litigation. Given the scope for experimentation within
the European Union, other Member States may also go beyond the baseline
requirements of EU policy and establish opt-out class actions, third-party
funding procedures, and perhaps even punitive damages.
Based on current practice and debated procedural reforms, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom appear most likely to
implement strong private enforcement systems. Portuguese law already
provides for opt-out class actions for all plaintiffs, although so far only
“qualified” consumer organizations have taken advantage of this
procedure.457
Denmark allows the government-appointed consumer
ombudsman to bring opt-out actions on behalf of consumers when each
individual claim has a value of less than DKK 2,000—about $300 in 2016.458
And the Netherlands has an opt-out settlement process.459
The United Kingdom has recognized the need for more effective private
rights of action and taken concrete steps to advance this objective. In March
2015, the UK Parliament enacted the Consumer Rights Act that allows
qualified organizations or injured parties to bring opt-out class actions for
violations of antitrust law.460 Importantly, the United Kingdom already has a
third-party litigation system that, though still in its infancy,461 could become
an important means of financing collective litigation.462 Taking a cue from
the United States rather than the European Union, one UK administrative
body has even eschewed a compensation-only approach to monetary
remedies. In 2012, the Competition Appeal Tribunal awarded exemplary
455
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damages to a firm victimized by predatory conduct, which brought a followon antitrust action.463
The prospect of expanding private rights of action in Europe is real. The
countries previously listed already have in place some of the elements of a
strong system of private enforcement. Provided they implement strong optout and funding mechanisms, they can facilitate a greater number of private
actions. In this event, these nations will have private enforcement regimes
that are stronger than those of EU Member States that enact only the
minimum requirements of the directive and recommendations, and possibly
also stronger than the private enforcement system in the United States.
VI. DIVERGENCE IN OVERALL ENFORCEMENT PATTERNS: A CASE STUDY ON
ANTITRUST IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
To understand the overall effectiveness of a legal regime, private and
public enforcement have to be analyzed together. Public and private
enforcement are both complements and substitutes for each other.464 Given
that much of the enhancement of private enforcement in the European Union
has arisen in the context of antitrust, it is an area ripe for comparative
examination. Overall antitrust enforcement will look quite different in the
United States and Europe. Private antitrust actions that follow government
enforcement exemplify complementary aspects; whereas stand-alone actions
illustrate how private enforcement can fill in for public actions. Where
public enforcement is weak, private enforcement will need to play a more
central role.465 But if public enforcement is more vigorous, private
enforcement will not be quite as essential.
Multiple indicia suggest that public antitrust enforcement is weaker in
the United States vis-à-vis Europe. The antitrust agencies in the United
States enjoy greater public discretion and have been reluctant to pursue noncartel cases. In contrast, in Europe, the European Commission and twentyeight national competition authorities generally face judicial checks on their
discretion and aggressively challenge both cartel and non-cartel activity.466
In light of these important differences in public enforcement, the private
enforcement deficit will be felt more acutely in the United States than in
Europe.
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A. Private Antitrust Enforcement Will Be Functionally Similar in the
United States and Europe
In the near term, private enforcement will have large gaps in both the
United States and Europe. Although the doctrinal barriers to effective
private enforcement are very different in the United States and European
Union, the private enforcement landscapes bear many similarities. Consumer
class actions face serious obstacles in both jurisdictions—due to the FAA and
rigorous class certification requirements in the United States and the opt-in
mechanism and restrictions on litigation financing in Europe. In practice,
consumers, small businesses, and other large, dispersed groups will have to
overcome high hurdles in enforcing their legal rights under the antitrust laws,
whereas medium-sized and large corporations will face fewer difficulties.
One Transatlantic difference in consumer suits is worth noting. Indirect
purchasers are ordinarily not in contractual privity with defendants. As a
result in U.S. states that permit indirect purchaser lawsuits, mandatory
arbitration clauses cannot bar these actions.467 At the same time, they do face
significant challenges at the class certification stage, including in showing
the ascertainability of class members. Nonetheless, some commentators are
cautiously optimistic about the future of indirect purchaser class actions in
the United States.468 In Europe, in contrast, the opt-in requirement, which
makes it very difficult to aggregate low value claims, likely dooms most
indirect purchaser suits.
In the United States, medium-sized and large businesses will face an
easier time protecting their legal rights than consumers will. Unlike
consumers and small businesses, who must ordinarily accept standard-form
contracts with arbitration provisions, larger businesses, in their capacity as
customers, can negotiate contracts with suppliers and insist on the exclusion
of mandatory arbitration clauses.469 And when businesses sue rivals in their
competitor capacity, contractual impediments such as arbitration do not arise.
Also, because their individual stakes in a case can be large, corporate
plaintiffs do not necessarily need to aggregate their claims with others
through the class action mechanism. As a result, the FAA and the higher
class certification standards do not restrict antitrust suits by business to the
same degree that they restrict consumer actions.
Despite these procedural advantages, businesses will continue to face
obstacles in standalone antitrust litigation in the United States. The more
permissive standards for granting defendants’ motions-to-dismiss and
467
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motions for summary judgment will hamper business plaintiffs. In general,
standalone cases, whether alleging collusion or exclusion, will be difficult to
prosecute because courts insist on detailed factual allegations before much
discovery has been taken.470 On the other hand, businesses are more likely to
succeed in follow-on suits brought after government enforcement action
produces a favorable decision or settlement.
In Europe, business plaintiffs may face fewer obstacles than their
American counterparts. Given the wide diversity of national laws, it is not
possible to generalize judicial attitudes toward business plaintiffs across EU
Member States. In the United Kingdom, businesses have brought successful
follow-on suits in the Competition Appeal Tribunal,471 which could be a
harbinger of more follow-on suits by injured competitors and other
businesses.472 The prospects of success of standalone suits, though less clear,
also seem promising. Encouragingly, some national courts, unlike courts in
the United States, have been reluctant to grant summary judgment or
otherwise terminate cases early in favor of defendants.473
B. Public Enforcement Is Not Likely to Compensate for the Private
Enforcement Deficit in the United States
At present, the U.S. antitrust agencies have great discretion over the
matters they bring—and do not bring. When the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission decide to close an investigation without
taking action, they face few, if any, transparency conditions. They are not
required to publish a statement or analysis and, in fact, are not even obligated
to disclose when they have closed an investigation.474 To their credit, the
agencies have occasionally issued closing statements when they opted not to
litigate high-profile matters.475 But the statements generally are brief and
often not especially informative to the public.476
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While private parties can file complaints and lobby the DOJ or FTC to
bring enforcement actions, the agencies are under no duty to respond and a
failure to act on a complaint is not subject to judicial review.477 In addition,
the nebulous legal standards of modern antitrust law confer broad discretion
on the antitrust agencies and allow for greater subjectivity in enforcement.478
When the antitrust agencies settle cases rather than proceed to trial, their
freedom of action is constrained to some extent. Under the Tunney Act, the
DOJ must publish the complaint, a competitive analysis, and the terms of the
settlement.479 The public then has a sixty-day window in which to submit
comments responding to the proposed settlement.480 At the end of this
period, the DOJ must respond to the public comments and submit the
settlement to a judge for approval.481 The FTC follows a similar notice and
comment process for its settlements but does not have to obtain judicial
consent.482
Although the Tunney Act was intended to strengthen public
accountability,483 the law in practice has merely added a procedural formality
to the settlement system.484 Appeals courts have directed district judges to
apply a highly deferential standard of review.485 They are prohibited from
looking beyond the DOJ complaint and inquiring into related but undisclosed
allegations of competitive harms.486 Courts review the settlement for
whether its terms address the competitive harms alleged in the government’s
complaint.487 Because the DOJ typically files the complaint and settlement
in court simultaneously, it can craft the complaint to fit with the settlement’s
provisions.488 Even in cases in which the DOJ has settled a case after it filed
a complaint in court (and in a fashion that appeared not to mitigate the
alleged harms to competition), judges have refused to second-guess the
DOJ’s judgment and reject the settlement.489 In practice, the Tunney Act
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process has generally operated as a judicial “rubber stamp.”490
With their broad prosecutorial discretion, the agencies have chosen to
emphasize cartel enforcement. An overwhelming fraction of case filings in
recent years have been against businesses and individuals accused of
collusive behavior.491 When challenging hard-core cartel activity such as
price-fixing and bid rigging, the Department of Justice pursues criminal
sanctions against corporations and individuals.492 These sanctions include
large fines for businesses and prison sentences for implicated individuals.493
These anti-cartel penalties are arguably more punitive than those sought by
other antitrust authorities. In particular, the United States is the only nation
that has consistently sentenced individual cartelists to terms in prison.494
In sharp contrast to its vigorous anti-cartel program, the DOJ filed only
one monopolization complaint and settled three such cases between 2005 and
2014.495 While the FTC’s enforcement focus has been somewhat more
balanced,496 its record is still modest. The agency has brought fewer than ten
conduct cases, which encompass actions challenging either collusive or
monopolistic conduct, in each year since 2007.497
Outside of price-fixing and bid rigging cases, the agencies have also been
significantly more restrained in the remedies that they pursue.498 When
prosecuting other forms of collusive behavior, the agencies have typically
sought injunctions that order the defendants to “go forth and sin no more.”499
Aside from a few rare exceptions,500 the agencies have not pursued
disgorgement as a remedy. In fact, from 2003 to 2012, the FTC followed
self-imposed limits on when it would seek monetary remedies in antitrust
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cases.501 Although the Sherman Act’s anti-monopolization section provides
for criminal enforcement, the U.S. government has not obtained a criminal
indictment in a pure monopolization case since the early 1970s.502
In monopolization matters, structural remedies have also fallen out of
favor. In the government’s last major monopolization case, Microsoft, the
DOJ settled the case in exchange for an assortment of conduct remedies.503
The days of ambitious government monopolization suits that resulted in the
restructuring of non-competitive markets appear to have ended with the
breakup of AT&T in 1982.504
The characteristics of public antitrust enforcement in the United States
underscore the need for vigorous private enforcement. The DOJ and FTC
enjoy broad prosecutorial discretion and have been unwilling to use their full
legal arsenal outside of the cartel context. Because public enforcement is
subject to regulatory capture and alone cannot provide adequate deterrence,
private rights of action are essential. And while private treble damages
actions provide vital deterrence against cartels, their role is even more
essential in areas such as monopolization and vertical restraints, which have
been largely neglected by government enforcers.
Given these realities, the decades-long attack on private enforcement by
the courts has seriously compromised the effectiveness of the American
antitrust enterprise. Public enforcement, as it presently operates, is not
capable of compensating for the private enforcement deficit. To be sure, the
agencies could opt to be more aggressive in the coming years. They could,
for instance, seek criminal penalties against monopolists that illegally
maintain their power.505 And state antitrust enforcers, who face tight
resource constraints,506 could enlist outside counsel and bring more parens
patriae actions on behalf of residents harmed by anticompetitive behavior.507
But until the antitrust authorities decide, and are provided the means, to
501
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increase their enforcement efforts, the U.S. antitrust system will have serious
gaps.
C. In Europe, Strong Public Enforcement Will Substantially Compensate
for Weak Private Rights of Action
In contrast to its American counterparts, the European Commission
enjoys much less prosecutorial discretion. European Union law imposes
broad transparency duties on EU institutions.508 For example, in the merger
area, the EC “systematically lists all notified transactions, disclosing the lines
of business in which participating firms are active, and reports [its]
dispositions of each of the notified transactions.”509 In select high-profile
merger clearances, the EC has published detailed analyses explaining its
decision.510
The EC also has an obligation to provide a written notification to
complaints from private parties.511 If it declines to act on a complaint, the
EC has to provide a factual and legal basis for its decision.512 And this nonaction decision is subject to judicial review,513 which, though deferential,514
still has substantive teeth. The European General Court has, in fact, vacated
decisions of the EC to close investigations because the Commission failed to
investigate sufficiently and respond adequately to a complainant.515 Of
course, the complaint system is not perfect: concentrated and organized
interests, such as competitors, are more likely to file complaints than diffuse
groups such as consumers.516
While national enforcers in France and Germany are considered more
aggressive and effective than those in other Member States,517 the national
competition authorities generally also face real constraints on their freedom
of action. National procedural rules are required to conform to the “principle
of effectiveness” in enforcing EU antitrust law.518
The European
Competition Network, a group comprising all EU competition authorities,
has both formal and informal means of policing underperforming agencies.519
508
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In addition, many Member States constrain the discretion of their
competition agencies. The French national competition authority has very
little discretion. It has to take action—positive or negative—on every
complaint it receives.520 On the other end of the spectrum, the German
competition agency has unfettered discretion.521 The norm across the twentyeight Member States appears to be close to the constraints imposed on the
EC.522 As an example, in the United Kingdom, the Competition Appeal
Tribunal has overturned OFT decisions to close investigations without taking
action.523
The EC and national competition authorities also face judicial scrutiny of
their settlements. EC settlements are subject to “market testing” whereby
interested third parties can submit comments responding to the terms of
settlement.524 While this process is akin to the Tunney Act’s notice and
comment requirements, the procedure in Europe appears more responsive
than the U.S. procedure.
As an example, consider the drawn-out
investigation of Google in Europe: the EC abandoned three settlement
proposals in response to criticism from injured competitors and the public
and ultimately charged the company in April 2015 with abuse of dominance
in internet search.525 In addition to market testing, settlements are also
subject to judicial review.526 The standard of review appears deferential,
although it has not been fully clarified.527 At the Member State level,
settlements are also subject to review. For example, the UK’s Competition
Appellate Tribunal can reject OFT settlements on procedural and substantive
grounds.528
European competition enforcers have targeted all forms of
anticompetitive behavior. While the EC has emphasized uncovering and
punishing cartels, it has also been aggressive in challenging abuses of
dominance (the European equivalent of monopolization), including predatory
pricing, price squeezing, and refusals-to-deal.529 The national competition
authorities have attacked a comparably broad, perhaps even broader, range of
anticompetitive conduct. For example, national competition authorities in
2014 brought cases against cartels, predatory pricing, resale price
520

Wils, supra note 518, at 355.
Id. at 359.
522
Id.
523
See, e.g., J.J. Burgess & Sons v. OFT, [2005] CAT 25.
524
E.g., Press Release, Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Market Tests Visa Europe's
Commitments – Frequently Asked Questions (June 13, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-13-554_en.htm; Council Reg. (EC) 1/2003, Art. 27(4).
525
EUR. COMM’N, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on Antitrust Decisions Concerning
Google (Apr. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-4785_en.htm.
526
Case C-441/07, Commission v. Alrosa Co., 2010 I-05949.
527
Id. In the Alrosa decision, the European Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s claim that
the proposed settlement went beyond the competitive harms identified by the Commission.
528
See, e.g., Skyscanner Ltd. v. Competition and Markets Authority, [2014] CAT 16, Case
No. 1226/2/12/14.
529
Harry First, The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 127, 135 (2009).
521

372 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 14, No. 2
maintenance, and tying.530
Just as they challenge many types of anticompetitive behavior, European
competition authorities seek aggressive remedies for all types of antitrust
violations. The European Commission has the power to impose fines of up
to ten percent of a company’s worldwide revenue.531 It today levies large,
albeit still inadequate,532 fines against cartels. The EC imposed fines of more
than €8.7 billion on just cartels between 2010 and 2014.533 These cartel
penalties are larger than what the United States levied on corporate antitrust
defendants during that four-year period.534 To be sure, the larger fines in the
European Union may reflect an important remedial difference: unlike in the
United States, criminal cartel enforcement against businesses and individuals
has yet to take root in Europe.535
Leaving aside the question of whether Europe or the United States is
more aggressive against cartels, the European authorities pursue more
aggressive remedies against antitrust violations in general. While their
fining power has frequently been directed at cartels, European competition
authorities have fined companies for a variety of non-cartel conduct. For
instance, in 2009, the European Commission imposed a €1.06 billion fine
against Intel for monopolizing the market for personal computer chipsets.536
And the EC has fined Microsoft nearly €2 billion for monopolizing the
personal computer operating system market and for failing to comply with its
legal commitments.537
National competition authorities have also levied large fines on
companies for cartel and non-cartel conduct. The French competition
authority in late 2014 fined thirteen consumer goods companies, including
Colgate-Palmolive and Procter & Gamble, nearly €1 billion collectively for
fixing the price of products such as deodorant, dishwashing soap, and
530
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toothpaste.538 In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading (absorbed by the
Competition and Markets Authority in April 2014539) over the past decade
fined companies for price-fixing540 and resale price maintenance.541 In the
soccer jersey case, which gave rise to the unsatisfactory private action by
Which?, the OFT fined the parties involved a total of nearly ₤15 million.542
The EC and national competition authorities will continue to play the
lead role in enforcing antitrust law in the EU. These entities operate in a
legal environment that stresses the primacy of public law enforcers,543 and
carry the burden of antitrust enforcement.544 Competition authorities in
Europe are subject to strong legal constraints that enhance public
accountability. Importantly, they have used their remedial powers across the
board—targeting collusion, monopolization, and other forms of
anticompetitive behavior.
Due to these features of public antitrust enforcement, the private
enforcement deficit will not be as damaging in Europe as it is in the United
States. Undoubtedly, EU Member States should go beyond the minimum
requirements of the directive and establish opt-out class actions and effective
litigation funding. Private enforcement has an important complementary
role, and its absence is likely to produce suboptimal enforcement.545 This is
particularly true for newer members of the European Union with less
538
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developed public enforcement systems.546 Nevertheless, given the stronger
public enforcement institutions in Europe as a whole, the overall enforcement
shortfall from weak private rights of action is not likely to be as great as it is
in the United States.547
VII. CONCLUSION
For as long as most can remember, the view across the Atlantic has been
markedly different when it comes to regulatory architecture. In the United
States, a comparatively weak public enforcement structure was buttressed by
a sturdy private enforcement regime through which members of the public
could directly regulate harmful conduct through litigation. By contrast, in
Europe, the structure was dominated by a strong state regulatory system with
private enforcement having only a negligible presence.
As time passes, the view across the Atlantic with respect to private
enforcement is beginning to look quite similar. In the United States, private
industry has waged a powerful, decades-long campaign against the civil
justice system. This message has been particularly effective in undermining
private enforcement. Beginning in the 1970s, industry cultivated and
propagated a business victimhood mythology, depicting corporations as
victims of a litigation explosion and casting plaintiffs (and their attorneys) as
mercenaries out to make easy money. This mythology has played a powerful
role in reshaping the attitudes of the public, legislators, and judges. As a
result, the federal courts have erected procedural barriers that subvert the
efficacy of private enforcement.
While private enforcement has been receding in the United States, it has
started to move to the fore in Europe. The developments have largely
emerged as the European Union and its Member States have sought to bolster
the enforcement of their antitrust laws. Progress thus far, however, has
assumed a one step forward, half step back pace. By “importing” the antiprivate enforcement messaging and narrative of business victimhood from
the United States, European Union lawmakers have declined to take the steps
necessary to establish strong private rights of action. Further progress in
Europe requires rejecting this empirically unsupported narrative of “litigation
excess” in the United States. Promisingly, some EU Member States have
enacted some of the procedural elements of a strong private enforcement
system and may be poised to go further.
Private enforcement has to be understood in a larger context—in relation
to its public counterpart. Despite the trend toward convergence of private
enforcement between the United States and Europe, the overall enforcement
picture is markedly different. Looking at one area of law, antitrust, a
546
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divergence in overall enforcement will emerge between the United States and
European Union. Given the broad discretion and restricted focus of public
enforcers in the United States, the hobbled private enforcement system will
severely compromise overall antitrust enforcement. For Europe, public
enforcement remains strong and dedicated to rooting out both
anticompetitive cartel and non-cartel behavior. So while Europe’s private
enforcement system is presently anemic for the most part, overall
enforcement will remain relatively robust. Notwithstanding weak private
rights of action on both sides of the Atlantic, Europe’s public-oriented
antitrust enforcement regime will possess greater vitality than its American
counterpart.

